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Introduction
This thesis contains three essays in applied economics which all deal with online markets.
The basic idea behind my investigations might seem simple: Identifying valuable informa-
tion and transforming the obtained advance knowledge into monetary profit, or, at least,
into fresh market insights.
Online markets provide favorable conditions for implementing automated tasks which
would otherwise be highly time-consuming. By automatically recording and analyzing
online market events, I am able to acquire valuable information regarding a large number
of current interactions with a reasonable amount of effort. The acquired datasets provide a
unique opportunity to investigate the market participants’ behavior. However, the three
chapters of my thesis are not solely concerned with analyzing behavioral data. They
are also about recognizing profitable market opportunities that arise, for example, from
loopholes in the market’s design or from information which should not be public, and
acquiring the unique datasets which are the empirical base of the thesis papers. Therefore,
Identifying, collecting and evaluating valuable information for this thesis in real-time in
order to exploit current bargain opportunities is a challenging and rewarding task.
The first chapter addresses the online betting market with regard to the 2012 U.S.
Presidential Election. In particular, I recorded minute-by-minute odds from dozens of
bookmakers and betting exchanges over a period of 14 months prior to the election. By
immediately analyzing this stream of information, I was able to identify price misalign-
ments across the market in real-time. In order to demonstrate that the observed violation
of the law of one price actually provides exploitable arbitrage opportunities, I invested
real money according to an arbitrage-based strategy. This strategy excludes all potential
risks, except for the risk that a platform becomes insolvent. The field experiment high-
lights the market’s accessibility and the costs incurred by implementing the strategy and
placing the investments. My methodology therefore enables me to provide evidence that
exploitable inter-market arbitrage opportunities exist in this market, affords an insight
into the market’s dynamics, and also allows me to enjoy a free lunch.
iv Introduction
Chapter 2 investigates the pay-per-bid auctions provided by labuyla.ch. The disclosure
of the auctioned item’s hidden price is the main incentive for placing a bid in price
reveal auctions. However, I observed that a loophole existed in labuyla.ch’s platform
which allowed an attentive observer to calculate the hidden price for free. In addition,
their auction design allowed me to observe and record the bidding behavior of all the
participants on their platform. The analysis of the dataset reveals that this loophole was
unknown to the active bidders. Moreover, my investigations on the observed behavior
lead to the sole conclusion that the auctioneer himself was cheating by participating in
the auctions as seller, bidder and buyer. I confronted the owner of labuyla.ch with my
research results and my findings were confirmed by the fact that they rapidly shut down
all of their auctions after our discussion.
In Chapter 3, I deal with another in-auction fraud, namely: shill bidding. Shill bidding
describes the fraudulent behavior of a seller who bids in his own auctions. The anonymity
in online auctions and the fact that a single bidder is allowed to open up several accounts
on a platform favors such misbehavior. Since auction houses profit from higher sales prices,
they have a reduced incentive to prohibit shilling. Several approaches in the literature
tackle this problem by identifying shill bidders on the basis of their publicly observable
behavior. While inspecting ricardo.ch’s website for public behavioral data, I detected an
information leakage — now closed — that allowed me to observe all accounts’ personal
details as well as the entered bidders’ valuations of the auctioned item. During a four-
month period I recorded the bidding history of nearly two million auctions. By comparing
the seller’s and the bidders’ personal details (name, address, and phone number) in these
auctions, I was able to accurately identify shill bidders in my dataset and analyze their
behavior. In addition, I test the accuracy of two identification algorithms which are based
on public information.
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Chapter I
Exploiting Arbitrage Opportunities
in Online Betting:
Empirical Evidence from the 2012
U.S. Presidential Elections
Abstract. This paper addresses the observation of arbitrage opportunities across on-
line betting markets and the empirical evidence of their exploitation. During the last 14
months prior to the 2012 U.S. Presidential Election, I extracted minute-by-minute odds
from numerous bookmakers and betting exchanges. I show that persistent price dispar-
ities existed on the election outcome’s odds which allowed for implementing a risk-free
investment strategy. By placing real investments, I was able to identify the actual costs
and risks of this strategy and empirically prove that exploitable arbitrage opportunities
exist in inter-market online betting.
Keywords: arbitrage; online betting; bookmaker; prediction market; betting exchanges;
election
Jelclass: D49; G14
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1 Introduction
In this paper, I provide empirical evidence that exploitable inter-market arbitrage op-
portunities exist in the online betting market. The empirical evidence results from real
investments which I made in order to exploit odds disparities on the 2012 U.S. Presidential
Election outcome across bookmakers and betting exchanges. The applied arbitrage-based
strategy does not, for example, face the risk that a platform restricts or closes the in-
vestor’s account. My suggested strategy ensures that the placed bets result in the same
profit no matter what the event’s outcome is or whether a bookmaker refuses future bets.
By personally placing bets, I am able to quantify the costs, assess the risks and iden-
tify barriers to the market which might limit the exploitation of such abnormal returns
and might explain their existence. Therefore, my findings provide consistent evidence
on the successful exploitation of theoretically observed inefficiencies, which, for example,
Oikonomidis and Johnson [2011] call for in their paper.
Several studies, which I will discuss in more detail in the next section, report the
existence of arbitrage opportunities as a result of analyzing odds disparities on online
betting markets. However, so far, very few papers were able to ascertain the monetary
value of the gains that can be drawn from exploiting the identified arbitrage opportunities.
One reason is that their findings are based on past events, and, therefore, a comprehensive
analysis of whether or not their strategies can be implemented is limited. Such studies
find evidence of what I call surebet opportunities. Surebets result from odds disparities
across different gambling markets and imply that an investor can gain a positive profit by
simultaneously betting on each possible outcome of an event. However, a surebet is not
in itself evidence of arbitrage. To ascertain that arbitrage is possible, all the costs, risks,
barriers and limits involved in an investment must also be considered.
My investigations are based on minute-by-minute odds which I recorded from dozens
of bookmakers and betting exchanges over a period of 14 months prior to the 2012 U.S.
Presidential Election. By observing the currently available odds and instantly checking
these values for arbitrage opportunities, I show that the information on currently existing
weak-form market inefficiencies is available. Moreover, the minute-by-minute data allow
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me to assess how persistent such exploitable inter-market arbitrage opportunities are.
By analyzing the offered odds on numerous platforms with regard to exploitable ar-
bitrage, I aim to present the online betting market in its entirety. If individuals place
investments at more than one platform, then observing only one leg of their activities
might lead to a false assessment of their behavior. The inter-market focus of this paper
aims to discover strategies which involve activities on more than one platform and, there-
fore, provide fresh insights on former observed investment patterns. Moreover, exploitable
cross-market arbitrage might prevent market prices from swiftly reacting to new infor-
mation if these platforms adjust prices at different rates. If, however, arbitrageurs are
present, then price manipulation is limited as well and becomes more costly to maintain.
Arbitrageurs might also link betters who do not have access to all platforms and thereby
exchange information and beliefs.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the related
literature and highlights the contribution of this paper. Section 3 characterizes the online
betting market, describes the extracted data, and explains my devised arbitrage-based
strategy. Section 4 analyzes the 2012 U.S. Presidential Primary Elections with regard
to surebets. In Section 5, I describe and discuss the experiment’s findings. Section 6
compares the months leading up to the election with the observations made during the
primaries. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature
This paper was inspired by Levitt’s [2004] article, ‘Why are gambling markets organized
so differently from financial markets’. Besides the markets’ similarities (e.g., investors
with heterogeneous beliefs or the markets’ zero-sum game structure), Levitt highlights
the markets’ differences. With regard to gambling markets, Levitt discusses bookmak-
ers’ strategies. He concludes that bookmakers only hire employees who are excellent at
predicting a game’s outcome in order to generate winnings. In addition, bookmakers use
their skills to deviate from the odds that clear the market in order to exploit bidders biases
and consequently achieve higher profits. However, asset quotes on financial markets are
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not determined by a few individuals. Financial markets serve to match the demand and
supply of many investors, which results in a continuously changing price.
Over the past years, prediction markets for sporting and political events have de-
veloped alongside traditional bookmakers services. The final cash value of their traded
assets depends on a specific event’s outcome. Prediction markets are organized like finan-
cial markets, but operate in the market traditionally covered by bookmakers. These days,
gambling markets (bookmakers) and financial markets (prediction markets) offer binary
options on the same events and, therefore, the law of one price should hold.
Levitt’s finding that bookmakers intentionally deviate from the market clearing price
might also open up arbitrage betting opportunities in the market. In this context, the most
widely discussed form of bias is the favorite-longshot bias (Griffith, 1949; Snowberg and
Wolfers, 2010). This behavioral bias describes a strategy which systematically undervalues
(odds are too high) favorites and systematically overvalues underdogs (odds are too low).
Other reported betting market biases are, for example, anti-incumbency (Rothschild,
2009), the home bias (Chincarini and Contreras, 2010), the disposition effect (Borghesi,
2011), the reverse favorite-longshot bias (Woodland and Woodland, 2003), and market
overreaction (Tetlock, 2004).
Vlastakis et al. [2009] as well as Franck et al. [2013] provide a brief overview of the
recent literature on betting market efficiency. As most of these studies (e.g., Hausch
and Ziemba, 1990; Dixon and Pope, 2004; Edelman and O’Brian, 2004; Paton and
Vaughan Williams, 2005) use data on past events, their findings refer to surebet op-
portunities. However, risks (e.g., counterparty risk), costs (e.g., transaction costs), and
market access, as well as the availability of the necessary information when the opportu-
nity occurred must also be considered in order to conclude that arbitraging was actually
possible. Chincarini and Contreras [2010] refer to the currency risk involved and note that
if all accounts were run in U.S. dollars, then this risk would be eliminated. Franck et al.
[2013] and Tetlock [2004] discuss the bet’s counter-party risk. In a recently published pa-
per, Rothschild and Pennock [2014] investigate price misalignment in prediction markets
and find a persistent price spread between Intrade and Betfair. They address in detail
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the costs and risks of a potential arbitrage strategy and discuss how the observed price
misalignment can persistently exist. In addition, they invested a few thousand dollars in
arbitrage bets in order to assess the size of the shadow order book in these exchanges.
Like Franck et al. [2013], I focus on inter-market arbitrage opportunities in online
betting markets, and consider bookmakers as well as prediction markets. Franck et al.
[2013] refer to data on past European soccer games, which cover a total of 11,933 top-five
league matches over seven seasons (from 2004/05 to 2010/11). They find evidence that:
“For 19.2% of the matches, the return on the short position hedged bet is positive and
yields an arbitrage opportunity with an average positive return of 1.4%.” [Franck et al.,
2013, p. 308–309] Their study investigates liquidity constraints and fees, but as their
analyses lack comprehensive data on these issues, they are unable to accurately estimate
the degree of market liquidity.
Croxson and Reade [2014] find that prices on Betfair swiftly and fully process new
information. Their analyses are based on second-by-second snapshots of Betfair’s order
book on soccer-related markets. To investigate the market’s information processing, they
analyze price developments in matches where goals were scored on the cusp of the newsless
half-time break.
Gil and Levitt [2007] analyze Intrade’s full order book for the soccer 2002 World
Cup second-by-second and find mixed support for the efficient market hypothesis. Their
dataset also contains the investors identification number which allows them to identify
the market makers who provide liquidity in these markets.
Rothschild and Sethi [2014] provide a comprehensive analysis of individuals’ invest-
ment behavior on Intrade, covering the entire two-year trading period prior to the 2012
U.S. Presidential Election. Based on transaction-level data provided by Intrade, they are
able to ex-post identify and analyze individuals’ trading activities. They assign individu-
als to one of the six categories of trading strategy that they identify based on six behavior
characteristics. Rothschild and Sethi [2014, p. 22] find “that the trading process is driven,
in large measure, by individuals with different interpretations of public information.” In
addition, Rothschild and Sethi [2014, p. 4] identify one investor who manipulated the
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market prices during the election day “by placing large bids for Romney and large orders
for Obama that effectively created a firewall, preventing prices from moving in response
to incoming information.” While Rothschild and Sethi [2014] analyze the complete trans-
action level data of all investors on Intrade, I focus on price comparisons across different
platforms. This comparison has the potential to provide evidence that other investors,
besides me, who are classified as ‘Extreme Bias’ by Rothschild and Sethi [2014] were
actually exploiting cross-market arbitrage.
Widely discussed price biases in the betting market might provide an opportunity
to gain abnormal returns in the long run (e.g., Lane and Ziemba, 2004; Paton and
Vaughan Williams, 2005; Borghesi, 2007) and might influence the reliable prediction of
an event’s outcome based on betting odds (e.g., Spann and Skiera, 2009; Snowberg et al.,
2012; Rothschild, 2009). However, neither of these two applications are within the scope
of this paper. Strategies which try to exploit biases through positive expected returns in
the long run face the risk that the bookmaker will exercise his right to restrict or close
the investor’s account. Several studies (e.g., Franck et al., 2013) refer to arbitrageurs who
were affected by such sanctions, and, therefore, highlight this uncertainty. For this reason,
I focus on surebets which yield the same profit for all possible outcomes of an event and
which are unaffected by sanctions that might restrict an investor’s future bidding options.
In this paper, price biases only become relevant if they differ across platforms and,
thereby, open up surebet opportunities. Such differences across platforms are, for exam-
ple, described by Smith et al. [2006] who find evidence that betting exchanges exhibit a
significantly lower market bias compared to bookmakers.
3 Materials and Methods
This section aims to provide the needed background in order to investigate this paper’s
hypothesis:
Hypothesis. Inter-market online betting offers exploitable arbitrage opportunities.
Firstly, I discuss overlaps and differences between bookmakers and betting exchanges,
briefly explain their functionality, and define how I handle the diversity of provided odds
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formats. In Subsection 3.4, I outline my suggested arbitrage-based strategy to exploit
price misalignments. Subsection 3.5 describes the covered events and defines the two
different periods under investigation. Finally, Subsection 3.6 provides information on the
acquired and analyzed dataset.
3.1 Odds Formats
Identical odds can be expressed in different ways. Bookmakers and betting exchanges
typically use English or European odds. Suppose that a bet on an event’s outcome has
European odds of 5. This means that if the outcome occurs, then the bettor receives five
dollars back for every one dollar at stake. Therefore, European odds express how many
units will be paid out per unit staked. The equivalent English odds would be 4/1 and
implies that the bettor wins four dollars for every dollar at stake. If the outcome occurs,
then the bettor receives his four-dollar winnings and his one-dollar stake back. Therefore,
English odds express how many units you win per unit staked, which is equivalent to the
return on investment (ROI). However, some betting exchanges (e.g., Intrade) determine
an asset’s final values, which depend on whether or not the underlying event’s outcome
occurs. These binary options are then traded among investors, while the asset’s price in
relation to the winner’s payoff can be interpreted as the probability that the outcome will
occur.
To increase comparability within this paper, I represent all odds and asset prices as the
implied probability ρ that a specific outcome will occur. The relationship across different
formats is:
ρ = 1English Odds + 1 =
1
European Odds =
price
winner’s payoff .
The subscripted character specifies whether the probability of occurrence is implied by
an available back (ρb) or lay (ρl) offer. To back a bet is equivalent to taking a long
position by buying contracts in the financial market, or to bet on an outcome’s occurrence,
respectively. On the contrary, laying a bet is equivalent to taking a short position by selling
contracts in the financial market, or to bet against an outcome’s occurrence, respectively.
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3.2 Bookmakers
Bookmakers determine by themselves which events they are willing to offer a limited stack
of odds on. Moreover, they also set each investor’s betting limits. For the investor, the
odds are take-it-or-leave-it offers. However, the displayed odds are without obligation for
the bookmaker, because each bookmaker analyzed in this paper has a clause in its terms
and conditions which is equivalent to WilliamHill’s paragraph 9.4: “We reserve the right
to refuse the whole or part of any Transaction requested by You at any time in our sole
discretion, or where You have breached the Terms of Use.”
With a bookmaker, the investor can only bet on an outcome occurring, because the
bookmaker always bets against the outcome’s occurrence. The bookmaker loses on some
outcomes (exactly one if odds are offered on all possible outcomes and these outcomes are
disjoint), and wins on all others. Bookmakers can sustain profits by overrounding their
balanced book. In the literature (e.g., Franck et al., 2013), this overround, which measures
the bookmaker’s share as a percentage of the payout, is interpreted as the bookmaker’s
commission. However, I define the bookmaker’s commission according to the commissions
taken by Betfair and WBX: as a percentage of the investments made. This definition of
the bookmaker’s commission is called vigorish and equals overround1+overround .
Example 1 The fair European Odds on each outcome (heads or tails) of a
coin toss is 2, which implies a winning probability of 12 = 50% per outcome.
Suppose now that a bookmaker offers odds of only 1.6 on each outcome. The
book is balanced if the total amount invested by individuals in each outcome
‘heads’ and ‘tails’ is equal. Odds of 1.6 imply a winning probability of 11.6 =
62.5% for each outcome and a total winning probability of 2 · 11.6 = 125%, or
an 25% overround, respectively. In this case, the bookmaker has a sure profit
on his balanced book due to his vigorish of 20% on the total investment.
Because bets are zero sum games, the vigorish equals the negative weighted ROI value
across all investors.
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3.3 Prediction Markets
In contrast to bookmakers, prediction markets provide a service that matches the demand
and supply for wagers by means of a double auction. Any investor can offer back as well
as lay positions. Moreover, he can freely choose the odds and the amount of money of his
order. All orders are listed in the book, and whenever a seller offers a price which a buyer
accepts, a trade occurs. To guarantee that an investor is able to bear all possible losses,
he must have sufficient free funds on his user account. This amount is frozen until the
bet is settled or the investor withdraws an unmatched order. As previously mentioned,
some prediction markets restrict investors to the trading of standardized assets which pay
a fixed amount to the winner.
Example 2 On Intrade, an asset for a specific outcome of an event will pay
the winner USD 10. Suppose that an investor is willing to buy one unit of this
binary option at a price of USD 6. Another investor offers a lay position at the
same price and is thus willing to pay USD 4 in order to receive a payoff of USD
10 if the outcome does not occur. The provider matches these investors and
freezes their possible losses, USD 4 on the buyer’s account and USD 6 on the
seller’s account. This trade implies a probability of pricewinner’s payoff =
USD 6
USD 10 =
60% that the underlying outcome occurs.
Prediction markets make their profits either by charging investors a fixed fee for using
their service or by charging a commission on net winnings.
3.4 Surebet and Arbitrage
Bodie et al. [2011, p. 324] define arbitrage as follows: “An arbitrage opportunity arises
when an investor can earn riskless profits without making net investments.” In order to
accommodate the expression of arbitrage, I define a concept called a ‘surebet’. A surebet
implies possible price inefficiency in the market. Such inefficiencies arise whenever an
investor can simultaneously place bets which, as a whole, yield the same positive profit
for each possible event’s outcome. However, the fact that candidates might switch parties
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during the election campaign, as Gary Johnson did on December 28, 2011, highlights the
importance of the same underlying event.
Surebets can be constructed in various ways. Placing a bet with a bookmaker and
selling the same bet at a prediction market is such an example. Franck et al. [2013] call
this strategy, which requires only two bets, short-position inter-market arbitrage. They
found that this surebet construction generates the highest returns. A surebet according to
this strategy occurs whenever ρb < ρl holds for the same event’s outcome. An equal profit
for either outcome can be reached by investing ilay = (1− ρl) · 10$ and iback = ρb · 10$.
This strategy gains a sure profit of pi = (ρl − ρb) · 10$, implying a ROI of ρl−ρb1−(ρl−ρb) .
Example 3 Suppose, that a bookmaker offers the (European) odds of 8
on a specific outcome. At the same time, a prediction market (offering assets
which pay USD 10 to the winner) has an unmatched back offer at USD 2.86
for the same event’s outcome. An investor can match this offer by laying at
USD 2.86. This investment costs him USD 7.14 and results in a payoff of
USD 10 if the outcome does not occur (zero elsewhere). Simultaneously, the
investor can back USD 1.25 against the bookmaker, which costs him USD 1.25
and results in a payoff of USD 10 if the outcome does occur (zero elsewhere).
The total investment made is USD 8.35, and the sure payoff is USD 10. The
ROI of this surebet is 19%.
The prediction markets’ commission on net winnings within a market can be consid-
ered by adjusting the implied winning probabilities. Such an adjustment, where the lay
probability equals 1 − 1−ρl1−commission·ρl and the back probability equals
ρb
1−commission , can be
interpreted as a higher investment that outweighs the exchanges’ commission.
I discuss the potential of some further surebet strategies in Section 4 and Section 6. If
not stated otherwise, the term surebet refers to the strategy described above. A surebet is
a necessary but not a sufficient condition for pure arbitrage in the online betting market
which always results in the identical profit. Potential counterparty- and currency risks,
transaction costs, or the fact that the invested money is frozen until the event occurs
are explanations for observing imaginary arbitrage. From my point of view, the term
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arbitrage is often hastily used in the literature, even if the attenuated label arbitrage
opportunity is correct. In order to state that arbitrage is actually possible, all these costs
and risks must be considered. However, as long as this is not the case, I use the term
surebet.
I do not state that my suggested investment strategy is optimal. According to the
investor’s preferences, he should probably take at least some risk in order to increase his
expected profit. However, exploitable surebets show that riskless profits are achievable
and, therefore, the expected profit of risky behavior should be compared to the gains of
these surebets.
3.5 Covered Events
In order to handle dozens of providers as well as a high frequency of observations, I
needed to limit the analyses to a few selected events. These events had to meet the
following criteria: (1) Bets on these events had to be offered by numerous bookmakers
and prediction markets in order to allow an inter-market comparison; (2) The events had
to be of sufficient public interest to secure adequate liquidity on the betting exchanges.
This liquidity is necessary to generate sufficiently high investments that are capable of
covering the fixed costs of the suggested strategy; and, (3) The corresponding bets had
to be available sufficiently far in advance in order to gain insight into the persistency of
potential arbitrage opportunities.
The 2012 U.S. Presidential Election (including the Primaries) fulfilled these criteria.
In the period between August 27, 2011 and November 07, 2012, this paper covers four
different events of the 2012 U.S. Presidential Election, namely: (1) 2012 Presidential
Election Winner (Individual); (2) 2012 Presidential Election Winner (Party); (3) 2012
Democratic Presidential Nominee; and (4) 2012 Republican Presidential Nominee. The
outcome of a specific event is, for example, labeled as ‘1:Obama’, which means that Barack
Obama wins the 2012 U.S. Presidential Election.
I divided the period into two phases, entitled: ‘primaries’ and ‘runoff’. The primaries
lasted from August 27, 2011 until May 11, 2012. During this phase I observed and an-
alyzed the online betting market in real-time with regard to surebets. The results are
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described in Section 4. My behavior during the runoff, from May 12, 2012 until Novem-
ber 07, 2012, was based on the experience that I gained from the primaries. I also consider
the Event 3 and the Event 4, but only for analyses during the primaries. Actually, the
official primaries lasted until the announcement of the official candidate nomination at the
National Convention of the parties. Mitt Romney was officially nominated as the Repub-
lican Presidential Candidate on August 29, 2012. Barack Obama was officially nominated
as the Democratic Presidential Candidate on September 05, 2012. Quotes on Event 3
and Event 4 were offered until these dates. However, Romney’s and Obama’s nomination
were already certain on May 12, 2012. Information about the covered platforms and their
offered events is given in Table 1.
3.6 Origin of the Data
To discover current surebets in ongoing bets, I wrote a program to extract the current
quotes from four prediction markets, and dozens of bookmakers. All outcomes of the four
events were covered. The automated extraction occurred every 60 seconds, such that any
change in the odds can be dated very precisely. The data were analyzed regarding surebets
and stored in a database. Finally, a summary of the current surebet opportunities was
periodically sent to my mobile phone. The extracted observations contain information
about the: platform, event, outcome, timestamp, quote format and the odds for book-
makers, or the order book (up to 15 positions) for prediction markets. The timestamp of
each quote was recorded exactly to the second. However, I round the observation time
up to the next minute in order to compare different providers’ odds.
The high frequency of data observations and the numerous platforms covered in this
paper permit a, so far, unique insight into the dynamics of the betting market. In addition,
the analysis of currently available back and lay positions at numerous bookmakers and
prediction markets allows me to identify current surebets opportunities.
4 Primaries: Market Analyses
By observing and analyzing current quotes during the primaries, I examine two necessary
conditions regarding my hypothesis. Firstly — and even though the existence of surebets
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Table 1: Overview of Bookmakers and Prediction Markets
Provider Primaries Runoff
Name URL 1 2 3 4 1 2
Bo
ok
m
ak
er
10Bet4 10bet.com x x
888sport 888sport.com x x
Bet365 bet365.com x x x x x
Betfred3 betfred.com x
Betsson1 betsson.com x
BlueSquare2 bluesq.com x x x x
Bodog bodog.co.uk x x
Boylesports2 boylesports.com x
Bwin1 bwin.com x x
Centrebet2 centrebet.com x x
Coral2 coral.co.uk x x
Intertops intertops.eu x x x x x
Ladbrokes ladbrokes.com x x
PaddyPower3 paddypower.com x x x x x x
PinnacleSports pinnaclesports.com x x
SkyBet2 skybet.com x x x x
Sportingbet sportingbet.com x x x x x x
StanJames5 stanjames.com x x x x x
Totesport3 totesport.com x
Unibet1 unibet.com x x
VictorChandler5 betvictor.com x x x x x x
WilliamHill williamhill.com x x x x x
Ex
ch
an
ge
s Betfair betfair.com x x x x x x
IEM6 tippie.uiowa.edu/iem x x x
Intrade intrade.com x x x x x x
WBX wbx.com x x x x x x
Notes: This table provides an overview of the bookmakers and prediction markets considered in this paper. Besides the
providers’ website URL, from which I retrieved the current quote, the covered events during the primaries and runoff are
marked. No ‘x’ during the primaries implies that I observed the quotes of this bookmaker only during the runoff. The
meaning of the superscripts is as follows:
1 Deposit of money is not free of charge.
2 Betting services are not available for Swiss residents.
3 The user account cannot be administered in U.S. dollars.
4 A minimum turnover of the deposited money is required.
5 The information on the investor’s individual limit is not provided by the host prior to a deposit.
6 Settlement is based on the popular vote plurality and not on who is elected.
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has already been confirmed in several studies — I show that surebet opportunities exist
in inter-market online betting.
Requirement 1. Inter-market online betting offers surebet opportunities.
Secondly, I require that the information needed to identify a surebet is available for
ongoing bets and that an investor has access to the corresponding betting platforms.
Requirement 2. Exploitable surebets exist in inter-market online betting.
This section is structured as follows. Subsection 4.1 and Subsection 4.2 briefly describe
the covered platforms. Subsection 4.3 highlights the providers’ importance with respect to
Requirement 1. Subsection 4.4 and Subsection 4.5 analyze the market in order to identify
surebets and capture their characteristics. Subsection 4.6 incorporates my observations
on the market developments within a couple of preliminary results and motivates my
suggested arbitrage-based strategy in the field experiment.
4.1 Bookmakers at the Primaries
My market observation during the primaries covered a total of 12 bookmakers, namely:
Bet365, BlueSquare, Bodog, Intertops, Ladbrokes, PaddyPower, PinnacleSports, SkyBet,
Sportingbet, StanJames, VictorChandler and WilliamHill.
Instead of charging an explicit commission, a bookmaker is sure to obtain the vigorish
by balancing his overrounded book. However, a bookmaker faces a trade-off between
obtaining higher profits on his balanced book (increasing the vigorish) and attracting
more investors (lowering the vigorish). The second option bears higher risks for the
bookmaker, because if his current odds do not balance the book, he might be forced to
adjust them. However, such an adjustment might result in a monetary loss in at least
some event’s outcomes. Therefore, the bookmakers must have the skills to reflect and
respond to changes in investors’ beliefs. This fact is even more important if his attractive
odds allow for inter-market surebets.
4.2 Prediction Markets at the Primaries
I observed and recorded the order book of four different prediction markets, namely: IEM
(Iowa Electronic Markets), WBX (World Bet Exchange), Intrade, and Betfair. The data
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contain the 1 (IEM), 3 (Betfair), 5 (WBX) and 15 (Intrade) best offers on each side of a
double-auction.
Market liquidity is an essential condition with regard to the possibility of investing
significant amounts of money in order to cover the strategy’s fixed costs. The IEM is
a small-scale futures market which is run by the University of Iowa, primarily for the
purpose of research. For this reason, IEM limits an individual’s total investments to USD
500 and is the only U.S. prediction market which is tolerated by the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (Arrow et al., 2008). In addition, the settlement of IEM’s winner-
takes-all market is based on the popular vote plurality winner and not on the elected
President’s party. The 2000 U.S. Presidential Election has shown that this difference in
the settlement rule can be important, because at that election the Democrats won the
popular vote plurality, but a Republican was the elected President (George W. Bush).
Thus, this difference prevents the possibility of making a direct odds comparison between
IEM and other providers, and I therefore exclude IEM from all further analyses.
On WBX, the liquidity was so low that in over 50% of the observations no open lay
offer existed. Moreover, if the market had an open position, then the average market
size on WBX was about one-fifth of its size on Intrade or Betfair. Intrade and Betfair
are similar with regard to the bets they offered and their market size. Even though
Gorge W. Bush signed the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act in 2006 (Arrow
et al., 2008), Intrade’s services were also available to U.S. citizens until the end of 2012.
However, Betfair’s services are classified as games of chance and are thus not available to
U.S. citizens.
Intrade charges a fixed monthly fee of USD 4.99 for their services. During the 2012
U.S. Presidential Election, Betfair and WBX charged a 5% commission on net winnings
within a market. A discount system might reduce the commissions that Betfair and WBX
require in stages down to 2.5% and 2%, respectively. However, to reach such a low level,
the investor must have paid commissions amounting to, at least, USD 12,600 on Betfair,
or USD 9,200 on WBX, respectively. Whenever I use prices offered by Betfair or WBX
for calculations, I take the maximum possible commission of 5% into account.
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4.3 Efficiency and Vigorish
Bookmakers as well as prediction markets should be, at least if they are considered in-
dividually, efficient. If not stated otherwise, I use the term ‘efficient’, signifying that
the currently offered prices do not allow for arbitrage by simultaneous betting on several
event’s outcomes.
A bookmaker who sets odds which imply a negative overround, or an inefficient predic-
tion market, would provide an easy opportunity to gain risk-free profits. The first column
of Table 2 reports the bookmakers’ vigorish and the prediction markets’ efficiency. The
calculated vigorish values and efficiencies refer to Event 2 and consider only the outcomes
2:Democrats and 2:Republicans. In order to increase comparability across platforms, I
do not include the odds on independent parties running for election, because the odds on
2:Independent are rarely offered. The vigorish values presented are larger than zero for
every single observation, and would be even larger if the outcome 2:Independent had been
included. No comparable vigorish can be calculated for Bodog and Ladbrokes, which do
not offer bets on the winning party.
The prediction markets’ efficiency, also in the first column of Table 2, is calculated
according to the bookmakers’ vigorish by using the back positions’ odds. However, these
efficiency values result from market behavior, whereas bookmakers set the vigorish.
A low vigorish implies that the bookmaker is offering, at least for one outcome, com-
paratively higher, and thus more attractive, odds. The bookmakers’ average vigorish
during the primaries lies between 6.9% and 8.6%, and is, thus, slightly higher than the
previously reported value of 5% (Gil and Levitt, 2007; Rhode and Strumpf, 2004) for a
typical bookmaker. Including odds for an independent party where possible increases the
observed vigorish by 1.3% on average. Since PinnacleSports has a much smaller vigorish
of 2.2%, I pay special attention to this bookmaker in the following analyses.
The values for the efficiency on Betfair and WBX are statistically significantly larger
than zero. In contrast, Intrade’s value is statistically significantly negative. However,
by including 2:Independent, Intrade’s mean efficiency increases to +0.8%, ranging from
-6.5% to +6.3%. Instead of backing all possible outcomes, prediction markets allow an
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Table 2: Comparing Bookmakers and Prediction Markets
Primaries Experiment Runoff
Provider V/E I ROI I ROI V/E I ROI
Bo
ok
m
ak
er
s
10Bet1 10.5% never best
888sport 27.8% 5.0% 6.6% 12.7% 5.1%
Bet365 7.3% 7.7% 5.8% 3.7% 4.9% 6.6% 0.9% 4.3%
Betfred1 6.2%2 0.0% 7.9%
Betsson1 5.3%2 0.0% 5.4%
BlueSquare1 6.9% 3.4% 4.7% 6.4% 12.8% 5.1%
Bodog 4.7% 3.7% 7.1%2 0.6% 9.0%
Boylesports 7.3%2 3.8% 7.6%
Bwin1 6.8% 0.0% 6.9%
Centrebet1 5.9% 0.0% 6.1%
Coral1 6.7% 0.0% 5.6%
Intertops 8.1% 1.5% 9.7% 14.3% 4.9% 6.8% 6.4% 5.6%
Ladbrokes 3.2% 5.8% 18.3% 6.5% 5.7%2 7.3% 9.9%
PaddyPower 7.0% 17.8% 4.3% 6.0% 7.1% 6.0%
PinnacleSports 2.2% 4.7% 4.1% 3.8% 4.4% 2.2% 0.2% 5.4%
SkyBet 7.7% 2.3% 4.4% 6.6% 9.5% 5.6%
Sportingbet 7.7% 4.9% 4.0% 7.5% 14.1% 5.7%
StanJames 7.5% 7.1% 5.7% 6.3%2 5.1% 7.5%
Totesport 5.8%2 5.1% 6.4%
Unibet1 7.8% 0.0% 7.9%
VictorChandler 8.6% 39.7% 5.5% 8.6% 2.2% 6.5%
WilliamHill 6.9% 3.1% 4.4% 32.0% 5.3% 6.3% 12.2% 5.5%
Ex
ch
an
ge
s
Betfair 4.3% 22.8% 3.6% 4.4% 0.1% 42.7%
Intrade -1.2% 66.6% 5.9% 100% 4.6% 0.6% 97.9% 6.1%
WBX 1.9% 10.6% 4.6% 2.3% 2.0% 11.5%
Notes: This table compares bookmakers and prediction markets according to their: (V/E) average vigorish or mean
efficiency; (I) importance for surebets; (ROI) average return on investment of the best available surebets in the market.
The meaning of the superscripts is as follows:
1 Manual data extraction (every 8 hours)
2 Average vigorish of Event 1 instead of Event 2
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investor to lay on two outcomes in order to guarantee that at least one of them will
occur. Intrade’s mean efficiency by following this strategy is +2.1%, ranging from -0.6%
to +16.0%.
In summary, bookmakers, as well as Betfair and WBX on their own, hardly ever offer
surebet opportunities. This finding reflects a broad agreement in the literature that bet-
ting platforms, considered individually, are efficient (Vlastakis et al., 2009; Tetlock, 2004;
Gil and Levitt, 2007). The bookmakers’ vigorish is typically higher than the exchanges’
efficiency value. In addition, surebet opportunities exist on Intrade either by buying con-
tracts on all three possible outcomes or by selling two of them. This finding is in line with
insights from Rothschild and Sethi [2014]. In their paper, Rothschild and Sethi [2014]
identify a handful of high-frequency traders who systematically exploit weak-form market
inefficiencies on Intrade.
4.4 Intra-Market Surebet Opportunities
By construction, the use of different bookmakers or several exchanges provides surebet
opportunities that are at least as profitable and as frequent as those conceived for a single
platform. Such intra-market surebet opportunities among bookmakers have already been
analyzed by Franck et al. [2013] and Vlastakis et al. [2009]. They find opportunities for
intra-market surebets in less than 1% of the soccer games in their data.
Comparing all bookmakers’ odds during the primaries reveals a mean vigorish of 2.1%,
when considering only the outcomes 2:Democrats and 2:Republicans. If all possible out-
comes are included, then the value increases to 3.2%. This intra-market vigorish is only
slightly lower than the PinnacleSports’ value and implies that PinnacleSports offers at-
tractive odds on both outcomes. Intra-market surebets across bookmakers are possible in
one-sixth of all observation points.
The average intra-market efficiency across exchanges is -2.2% when betting on 2:Demo-
crats and 2:Republicans, -0.3% when backing on all outcomes, and -0.9% when laying
bets on two outcomes. As mentioned in Section 4.2, these values include a 5% commis-
sion on Betfair and WBX. Even though surebet opportunities permanently exist, their
mean return on investment is moderate. Across prediction markets, surebets can also be
Primaries: Market Analyses 19
constructed by backing an outcome at one exchange and selling a contract on the same
outcome at another prediction market. Betfair and WBX allow for only 5 surebet op-
portunities out of over 1.3 million intra-market comparisons on the outcomes 1:Obama,
2:Romney, 2:Democrats and 2:Republicans. The prices on these two platforms co-move
very closely, which supports the finding of Wolfers and Zitzewitz [2004] that arbitrage
opportunities between Tradesports and WorldSportsExchange are virtually absent due to
the close co-movement of their prices. Rothschild and Pennock [2014] describe a persistent
price spread between Intrade and Betfair which entails the opportunity for net earnings
between 1 and 5%. My observations during the primaries confirm this spread. Positive
return on investments, significant to the 1% level, are possible on 1:Romney by laying on
Intrade and backing on either Betfair or WBX. The same is true for surebets by taking a
short position on Intrade and a long position on Betfair for the outcomes 1:Obama and
2:Democrats. Even though the average ROIs are under 2%, surebets with an ROI of over
46% are occasionally possible.
4.5 Inter-Market Surebet Opportunities
The most promising intra-market surebet construction investigated so far exploits price
spreads across prediction markets on the same underlying outcome. However long posi-
tions can also be taken against bookmakers. In this subsection, I analyze short-position,
inter-market surebet opportunities. Such surebet opportunities may exist on each po-
tential outcome that is offered by at least one prediction market and one bookmaker.
To identify short-position, inter-market surebets, I use the exchanges’ lowest ρl and the
bookmakers’ highest ρb to calculate the return on investment. A positive ROI implies a
surebet opportunity.
For each minute during the primaries, I calculated the highest available surebet op-
portunity over all outcomes and providers. Figure 1 shows the development of the best
available ROIs.
The existence of inter-market surebet opportunities is not a new finding (Vlastakis
et al., 2009; Franck et al., 2013). However, the permanent existence of surebet oppor-
tunities, with a mean of 5.3%, solely with bets on the 2012 U.S. Presidential Election is
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Figure 1: ROI of the Best Available Surebets During the Primaries
Notes: This figure shows the return on investment of the best available surebets over all events, outcomes and providers
during the primaries. Inter-market surebet opportunities (positive ROI) existed during 98.7% of all minutes. The mean
ROI is 5.3% (std: 0.045) and the maximal ROI of an observed surebet reaches 311.79%. Surebets with a ROI greater than
50% are represented by a triangle.
remarkable.
In Figure 1, extreme values with a ROI over 50% are represented by a triangle. Cu-
rious offers from some individuals on Betfair are the cause of these inter-market surebet
opportunities with a maximal ROI of over 300%. Within a couple of minutes these distor-
tions were eliminated. I assume that the respective investors had placed these offers by
mistake. These mistakes are caused by the different ways in which the providers express
the offered odds. Another possible explanation for such extraordinary offers is that the
investor either made a speculative attack or tested the market for efficiency, as Rhode
and Strumpf [2006] did during the 2000 U.S. Presidential Election.
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Before I address the two requirements and the hypothesis under investigation, I sub-
divide the best available ROIs by the respective underling outcomes and providers. The
analysis of these best available ROIs aims to identify whether or not a focus on several
providers and markets still allows most of the available best surebets to be identified.
Because there are, at several points in time, either multiple outcomes and/or providers
which result in the same surebet’s ROI, the aggregate share of the respective underling
outcomes or of providers, respectively, is typically larger than one. Thus, I define the
index ‘importance’ as the share of the individual elements divided by the aggregate share
of all the elements.
A total of 41 outcomes reflect the best ROIs, although 21 of these have an importance
of less than 1%. Table 3 shows several indicators of the six most important and of four
selected outcomes.
Table 3: Important Outcomes Reflecting the Best ROIs
Outcome Importance (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1:Romney 29.32% 5.9% 2.1% 10.2% 108,666 235,620 366,841
4:Romney 21.43% 7.9% 1.1% 149.0% 79,441 198,845 366,387
2:Republican 12.30% 4.4% 1.1% 13.2% 45,591 207,069 366,474
3:Warner 11.93% 3.0% 0.5% 21.3% 44,204 141,309 351,184
4:Gingrich 4.27% 3.9% -1.0% 18.4% 15,818 114,720 366,485
4:Palin 4.07% 2.3% -0.4% 18.0% 15,084 45,811 123,979
2:Democrat 0.64% 3.9% -2.3% 5.8% 2,363 52,084 366,609
4:Santorum 0.26% 9.3% -0.5% 36.8% 971 65,734 312,885
1:Obama 0.24% 2.0% -3.1% 4.8% 874 14,379 366,862
1:Paul 0.18% 19.3% -0.2% 180.0% 666 101,353 366,591
4:Perry 0.17% 5.9% -2.3% 43.6% 632 28,479 205,149
Notes: This table shows the six most important and five selected outcomes reflecting the best ROIs. The additional
indicators in this table describe the: (1) mean ROI if the surebet is the best in the market; (2) mean ROI; (3) maximum
ROI; (4) number of best ROIs observed; (5) number of surebets observed; (6) total number of observations.
The six most important outcomes reflect more than 80% of all the best ROIs. The
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outcomes concerning Mitt Romney and the closely related outcome 2:Republican domi-
nate the best ROIs. Column (2) shows that these outcomes also promise the highest mean
return on investment. This relationship is self-evident, because ‘high importance’ implies
that this outcome offered the best ROI in many observations. The values in column (1),
the mean ROI, if the surebet is the best in the market, is susceptible to outliers, which
are captured by the maximum ROI in column (3). Thus, the value of 19.3% for 1:Paul
in column (1) is a consequence of the large outliers in column (3) and the low number
of best ROIs observed in column (4). Column (6) presents the total number of obser-
vations for each event, given that at a specific point in time a lay and a back position
was available. The majority of these values are close to the theoretically possible 371,520
observations and, thus, support the observation accuracy of the recording algorithm. On
the one hand, missing observations may arise from changes in a website’s source code or
owing to technical problems in the execution of the extraction algorithm; on the other
hand, they may result from periodic website maintenance or may simply indicate that no
odds were offered. The low observation values for 4:Palin and 4:Perry result from the fact
that Sarah Palin and Rick Perry publicly stated that they suspended their candidatures
on October 05, 2011, and January 19, 2012. In contrast, the lower value of 4:Santorum
results from an error in the algorithm, which did not record Rick Santorum’s odds during
October 2011.
Each of the three most important outcomes provide a surebet opportunity in more
than two thirds of all observations, implied by the ratio of the values between column (5)
and column (6).
Figure 2 provides insights into the development of the odds and surebet opportunities
for six important outcomes. These figures add a time dimension to the values in Table
3. The gray background indicates, that at the indicated time the outcome offered the
market’s best surebet. The outcomes’ ROI develop a momentum of potential surebets
or best ROIs in the market. Since the beginning of 2012, the outcomes for 1:Romney
and 2:Republican are almost the only bets to offer the best ROI. Prior to that date, the
outcomes for the primaries provided the most lucrative offers. The horizontal zero line
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separates potential arbitrage opportunities from sure losses. The corresponding figures
on the right-hand side provide an insight into how the ROI fluctuations depend on the
outcome’s probability changes. The black points represent the best available lay position.
The best available back position is represented by the upper boundary of the gray area. Of
course, a continuous boundary is not completely correct and might imply the availability of
a back position where none was available. However, because bookmakers adjust their odds
less often than prediction markets, I justify using lines as this increases the readability of
the figures. Surebet opportunities, or respectively a positive ROI, are available whenever
the black dot lies above the gray area at a specific moment in time.
The odds of 1:Romney, 4:Romney and 2:Republican are related. The probability that
Mitt Romney will win the presidential election equals the product of the probabilities that
he will win the Republican primaries and that the Republican Party wins the presidential
election. 4:Romney’s Odds show three major drops that occur between November, 2011
and February, 2012. During these drops Mitt Romney was challenged by Newt Gingrich
(first and second drop) as well as by Rick Santorum (third drop).
Prediction markets tend to react faster to new information than bookmakers, and
this seems to be the reason for surebet opportunities whenever an outcome’s probability
rises. 3:Warner is a typical example, where the odds at a prediction market change, but
the best bookmaker makes no adjustment to his odds. I use the term ‘best bookmaker’
to refer to the bookmaker who offers the currently lowest ρb in the market. The case
of Rick Perry’s lapse of memory in the Republican presidential primaries demonstrates
the market’s immediate reaction to such news. In the GOP debate on November 09,
2011, Rick Perry began an enthusiastic speech about his political program, promising to
eliminate three government departments. Unfortunately, he was unable to remember all
three of them and is quoted as admitting: “I can’t. The third one, I can’t. Sorry. Oops”.
The price of the 4:Perry stake immediately responded to that incident. Intrade’s offered
lay odds on his winning probability reacted after 3 minutes and dropped within 9 minutes
from 8.7% to 3.0%. This immediate price reaction with following drift is in line with the
findings of Gil and Levitt [2007] and Croxson and Reade [2014].
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Figure 2: Surebet Opportunity and Odds Development of Six Important Outcomes
(a) 1:Romney ROI (b) 1:Romney Odds
(c) 4:Romney ROI (d) 4:Romney Odds
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(e) 2:Republican ROI (f) 2:Republican Odds
(g) 3:Warner ROI (h) 3:Warner Odds
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(i) 4:Gingrich ROI (j) 4:Gingrich Odds
(k) 4:Santorum ROI (l) 4:Santorum Odds
Notes: These figures show the development of surebet opportunities as well as the implied chance of winning the underlying
event during the primaries. The gray background indicates that at this time the outcome offered the market’s best available
surebet. Surebet opportunities or positive ROIs, respectively, are available whenever the black dot lies above the gray area
at a specific moment in time.
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The best lay and back position may be driven by a single platform and therefore a
general statement concerning the speed of acquiring new information is dangerous. In ad-
dition, other possible explanations must be considered. For example, if positive-feedback
traders are present, then the model of De Long et al. [1990] can explain overreaction to
news. Bookmakers whose odds reflect the true probability more accurately might then
be forced to adjust their odds in order to rebalance the book. I address this question in
Section 6 with respect to the runoff data.
The second column of Table 2 shows the distribution of the best ROI with regard to
the related providers. VictorChandler and Intrade are by far the most important providers
with regard to surebets during the primaries.
4.6 First Results
Only a few bookmakers and Intrade are responsible for the best available surebets. Sure-
bets are typically possible when ρl increases, but not when ρl decreases. At a first glance,
this seems strange as surebets should occur whenever the markets are not balanced. The
reason for this observation might be that, on the one hand, laying against a bookmaker
is not possible, and, on the other hand, exchanges seem to be the price leaders. Surebets
are typically possible for events where the candidate is a close follower of the leader (e.g.,
1:Romney) or is thrust into the spotlight (e.g., 4:Gingrich). Within a single platform,
surebets are hardly ever possible and solely Intrade — the only betting exchange which
charges a fixed fee instead of a commission — allows for a strategy that provides, on av-
erage, a positive return on investments. The analysis provides evidence for intra-market
surebets, but the highest average ROIs exploit inter-market surebet opportunities.
Requirement 1 is definitely fulfilled in the underling events regarding the 2012 U.S.
Presidential Election. Requirement 2 is not yet fulfilled. Although the information on
current surebets is available, I have not yet considered whether or not the corresponding
betting platforms are accessible. I deal with this last condition in the next section. In
addition, I will check the following three observations regarding the primaries during the
runoff in order to verify their validity.
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Observation 1. Concerning all four markets, surebets existed for 98.7% of the
observation dates. They reached a mean ROI level of 5.3%. A
surebet opportunity on an outcome was typically available for
several weeks.
Observation 2. Surebets typically occurred when ρl increases and ρb remains low.
Observation 3. VictorChandler and Intrade are by far the most important
providers.
5 Runoff: Field Experiment
The previous section concludes that persistent surebets exist in the market and that the
information required to identify them is publicly available for ongoing bets. This section
presents a field experiment that I performed to highlight the risk and cost structure as
well as the market size regarding investments in surebets. Furthermore, I outline the
background to one of over 6,300 individual investors observed by Rothschild and Sethi
[2014]. My experiment shows that inter-market arbitrage does not need to be excessively
costly or complicated and reveals that ‘Trader D’ in Rothschild and Sethi [2014] probably
used a strategy similar to mine. The most important objective of this study was to
validate or reject my hypothesis that observed price inefficiencies across betting platforms
can actually be exploited.
The most profitable and persistent surebets in the primaries occurred when the pre-
diction markets reflected that an outsider had entered the market as a serious competitor.
Rick Perry’s ‘Oops’ moment demonstrated that candidates’ statements in televised de-
bates can influence prediction markets within a few minutes. I therefore precisely followed
the activity of the online betting markets during the presidential debates.
5.1 Prediction Markets in the Field Experiment
I only used Intrade for laying bets on the exchanges. Betfair and WBX were not considered
for the following two major reasons: Firstly, during the primaries, Intrade was responsible
for most of the best available surebets in the market; Secondly, Betfair and WBX charge
a 2.5%–5% commission on net winnings within a market. Even though the commission is
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not in itself a criterion for exclusion, the fixed monthly fee of USD 4.99 for using Intrade’s
services promises lower costs in comparison.
5.2 Bookmakers in the Field Experiment
The odds offered by 10Bet, 888sport, Betfred, Betsson, Boylesports, Bwin, Centrebet,
Coral, Totesport, and Unibet were tracked in addition to the twelve bookmakers tracked
for the primaries. Unfortunately, only 6 of the 22 bookmakers that were initially selected
could be considered for the field experiment. These six bookmakers are: 888sport, Bet365,
Intertops, Ladbrokes, PinnacleSports, and WilliamHill.
Bodog is a special case. On the one hand, I once tried to deposit money with Bodog,
but my bank refused any transaction with it. On the other hand, Bodog closed its service
on October 5, 2012. Even though Bodog was included at the beginning of the experiment,
I excluded it from subsequent analyses. Sportingbet was not included, because their
settlement rule differs from the other platforms.
Another fourteen bookmakers were not included, because they did not fulfill at least
one of the following criteria: (1) Depositing money is free of charge; (2) Betting services
are available to Swiss residents; (3) The user account can be administered in U.S. dollars;
(4) No minimum turnover of the deposited money is required; or, (5) The information
about the investor’s individual limit is provided by the host prior to a deposit. While I
required criteria (1) for reasons of simplification, criteria (2) was essential in order to fulfill
Requirement 2. Finally, criteria (3), (4), and (5) provide essential information relating to
arbitrage, because these restrictions exclude sources of currency risk as well as uncertain
investment opportunities. Table 1 provides information about the reasons for excluding
specific bookmakers.
All actions were performed in accordance with the platforms’ terms and conditions. I
disagree with Franck et al. [2013, p. 311] who assert in their paper that all bookmakers
considered in their paper can cancel bets ex post, for example, on suspicion of arbitrage
betting. In particular, their passage quoting WilliamHill’s terms and conditions is mis-
leading. The actual wording of the rules in the WilliamHill’s [2012] terms and conditions,
paragraph 11.4, are formulated as follows:
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If: [...] You have placed bets and/or played online games with any other online
provider of gambling services and are suspected (as a result of such play) of
any Prohibited Practice or otherwise improper activity [...] then, (including in
connection with any suspension and/or termination of Your Account) we shall
have the right, in respect of Your Account (and/or any other account held
by You with a William Hill group company) to withhold the whole or part
of the balance and/or recover from the account the amount of any deposits,
pay-outs, bonuses or winnings which have been affected by or are in any way
attributable to any of the event(s) contemplated in this paragraph 11.4. [...]
Using the services of different gambling websites is only forbidden in connection with
fraudulent behavior; for example, cheating or collusion. Placing bets on the same event
at different platforms itself is not prohibited. Upon request, WilliamHill affirmed to me
that this is the correct interpretation of paragraph 11.4 in their terms and conditions.
5.3 Course of Action and Investments
The algorithm compared the current odds at least three times a day (around 1 AM, 9
AM and 5 PM EST) and sent me a market overview. If the algorithm reported any
surebets exceeding a previously defined threshold, I exploited these. In the beginning
of the experiment, I set the threshold at 5%, which is slightly lower than the average
ROI during the primaries. During the experiment I increased this threshold in order to
prevent myself from spending the available funds too early in the runoff. I set myself
other terms such as a minimum U.S. dollar profit on the first bet with a new bookmaker
or an obligation to split investments that exceed USD 900 in order to reduce the risk of
unexpected circumstances.
Finally, I invested a total of USD 25,000 in 39 surebets on 1:Romney and 2:Republi-
cans. The mean ROI of these surebets is 6.8%, with a maximum of 14.05%. The proceeds
from the surebets amounting to USD 1,764 are offset by expenses incurred by service and
transaction charges amounting to USD 134. Appendix A.1 lists all investments of this
field experiment.
I started the field experiment with an investment capital of around USD 11,000. In
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July 2012, see Figure 3(b), the ROI on available surebets decreased, and I thought that
the market would become more efficient as the election approached. Owing to my —
in retrospect mistaken — assessment, I invested my remaining funds up until August 2,
2012. A few days later, the ROI improved substantially, and new funds allowed me to
continue betting on surebets.
The money invested with the prediction market is frozen in the account until the
settlement of the bet. Intrade accept credit card deposits, but only up to USD 2,000
over a 30-day period. Credit card payments have a major advantage, as transfers to the
user accounts take only a few seconds and thus prevent idle money from accumulating
on users’ accounts. Bookmakers generally allow much higher credit card deposits than
Intrade. As I laid bets solely on Intrade, I deposited larger amounts in advance in my
Intrade account by means of international wire transfer in order to avoid this friction.
These transfers were credited to my Intrade account the next working day.
Information about current odds were extracted and compared automatically. On the
other hand, transferring money and placing bets were manual tasks. My investment order
for the first 2 bets was: Place lay investments first and then invest in the back position. My
idea was that it might be safer to first invest in the market that changed more frequently.
In the second bet, I did not check the maximum stack size at 888sport in advance. I then
had to use Bet365 to hedge the lay positions that I had already bought. Even though this
was my mistake, I decided to change the investment order, because bookmakers are not
committed to the odds they offer. A second mistake of mine, which I detected a few days
later, occurred on August 2, 2012, when I bought too many contracts on WilliamHill.
After the bets were settled on November 7, 2012, I withdrew all funds from Intrade.
Intrade dispatched my withdrawal request on November 14, 2012. Two working days
later, the money was credited to my bank account.
5.4 Risks
Potential risks of the field experiment’s investments are:
Currency risks I precluded currency risks by selecting bookmakers and exchanges which
permit U.S. dollar accounts. In addition, all account fees and credit cards were
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administered in U.S. dollars.
Counterparty risks Three contractual relationships in the field experiment bear coun-
terparty risks.
1. Bookmakers announce their odds as well as the (individual) stack limits. These
offers are non-binding and the bookmaker can reject bets without explanation.
But once they have accepted a request and assign a reference number to the
bet, the contract is binding. The change in the investment order after my first
two bets account for this uncertainty. I agree with Franck et al. [2013, p. 311]
that a bookmaker can back out of a contract if the investor has violated the
terms and conditions of the platform. Therefore, it was important to act in
compliance with the provider’s terms and conditions.
2. Since Intrade freezes the money to cover potential losses on the investor’s ac-
count, the contracting partner faces no risk.
3. The operator of the platform is obliged to provide the operational services
and manage the money accounts. The risk that the platform might delay
withdrawals or, in the worst case, becomes bankrupt cannot be ruled out.
This insolvency-risk must be kept in mind.
Unlikely circumstances This risk occurs if an unlikely circumstance prevents unam-
biguous settlement. In sports, it is possible for events to be cancelled or abandoned.
However, as the markets under investigation refer to the 2012 U.S. Presidential
Election, the threat of this risk is negligible.
5.5 Costs
Gains from surebets must cover their expenses in order to provide profitable investment
opportunities. Such expenses result from:
Service costs While the accounts on bookmakers platforms are free of charge, Intrade
charges a fixed monthly fee (USD 4.99) for its services. Intrade and VictorChandler
charge a fee for withdrawals of USD 20 and USD 24, respectively, whereas other
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providers offer this service without charging a commission. Neither my bank account
nor my pre-paid credit card carried charges.
Transactions These fees cover deposits to the credit card (USD 3) and commissions on
international wire transfers either by my bank (at least USD 6) or by any interme-
diate banks (typically around USD 20).
Search costs Identifying surebets by checking current quotes manually would result in
high opportunity costs. These variable costs present an argument against the exis-
tence of arbitrage. In the context of this paper, I wrote a program that automatically
extracts the current odds, identifies surebets and periodically transmits this infor-
mation to my smartphone. Therefore, my search costs were fixed, and the program
could be adjusted for forthcoming events.
Cost of capital The invested capital was an interest-free loan, and thus the cost of
capital was zero. At the current rate of interest, the cost of capital is generally
negligible.
Taxes For Swiss residents, net profit on the applied investment strategy is subject to
Federal Direct Tax according to Article 16 DBG. The actual tax due will be a
fraction of the net gain (after all costs are subtracted), and will therefore not impact
the profitability of the strategy.
Table 4: Experiment’s Total Service and Transaction Costs
Intrade’s fixed service fee for six months USD 29.94
Transactions to the pre-paid credit card USD 12.00
Wire transaction to Intrade (three deposits) USD 23.00
Intrade’s service fee for withdrawal USD 20.00
Various intermediate-bank charges for wire transactions USD 49.04
Total USD 133.98
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Table 4 shows the composition of the total service and transaction costs which accrued
throughout the field experiment. As these costs are almost fixed, they will diminish as
investments in surebets increase.
5.6 Market Size
Bookmakers’ maximum betting limits determined the long side of the market. Each
bookmaker’s terms and conditions contain information about its maximum betting limit.
But this value, which typically ranges between USD 200,000 and USD 1,000,000, is almost
always disproportionate to the investor’s individual limit. Ladbrokes and PinnacleSports
stand out from the other bookmakers. Not only do they provide a considerably higher
individual betting limit of over USD 7,000 per day, they also subsequently reset the limit
back to this level within 24 hours. My available capital did not allow me to fully test these
limits, but on August 24, 2012 (Bet 27) I invested USD 1,900 on PinnacleSports without
any problem. WilliamHill and 888sport also increased the individual limit after bets were
placed, but at a much lower level. On both platforms, this individual restriction limited
investments to profitable surebet opportunities. 888sport allowed bets for a total of only
USD 366, whereas bets of nearly USD 4,000 were possible on WilliamHill. Bet365 (USD
954) and Intertops (USD 821) do not increase the individual limit after a bet has been
placed. Nevertheless, large surebet opportunities such as that on November 6, 2012 08:37
PM EST are possible. At that point in time, Ladbroke’s limit of USD 8,050 allowed for an
investment amounting to USD 53,895.36 at a ROI of over 19.5%, and repayment within
12 hours to be made. This amount is nowhere near the size of investments made by Wall-
Street traders, but is quite large for most individual investors. Due to lack of information
regarding the exchanges’ full order book, bookmakers’ limits, market accessibility and
other restrictions, these analyses reveal only a lower bound of the actual market size for
a Swiss resident.
Higher liquidity on exchanges may or may not increase the platform’s efficiency and
lower surebet opportunities. The decisive factor is who provides the liquidity. Arbi-
trageurs certainly reduce price differences within or across providers. However, Rothschild
and Sethi [2014] find strong indications of a manipulator who provided liquidity in order
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to shield a high price on 1:Romney contracts. This price shield is also visible in Figure
4(b).
5.7 Results
Having shown the existence of surebets in Section 4, I check Requirement 1 for the runoff.
Figure 3(a) is a counterpart to Figure 1 and shows the best observed surebets at each
point in time. Since surebets existed almost continuously during the runoff, Requirement
1 is clearly fulfilled and Observation 1 confirmed.
A surebet is exploitable if the necessary information on the surebet is available at the
time of its occurrence and if the markets are accessible. The first condition is satisfied,
as the odds were observed and analyzed in real time. For the purposes of the second
condition, Figure 3(b) again shows the best observed surebets at each point in time.
However, this time, only Intrade and the six bookmakers considered in field experiment
are included in the analyses. The mean ROI thereby decreases from 6.3% to 5.5%, and
the probability that at a random minute in time an exploitable surebet opportunity exists
decreases from 96.7% to 95.7%. The bookmakers included in the experimental setting are
all accessible to Swiss residents, thus fulfilling Requirement 2. I expected a falling ROI
such that the annualized ROI would remain more or less stable. The opposite turned
out to be the case: As the election day drew closer, the ROI became more volatile. This
observation, in association with the insight of Rothschild and Sethi [2014] regarding the
successful price shield of the manipulator, implies that biased traders, as well as noise
traders, heavily dominated unbiased traders in the market in the last few weeks leading
up to the election. With the benefit of hindsight, the most profitable tactic would have
been to invest all the money on the election day of November 6, 2012 08:37 PM EST at
a ROI of over 19.5%, repayment within 12 hours.
My experiment’s arbitrage-based strategy resulted in the following characteristics used
by Rothschild and Sethi [2014]. My strategy’s value for what they call ‘aggression’ equals
1 and results from taking liquidity out of the market by matching offered lay positions.
Duration = 1 and direction = +1 result because all bets on Intrade were short, either
on 1:Romney or 2:Republicans, and were held to expiration. During the whole runoff,
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Figure 3: ROI of the Best Available Surebets During the Runoff
(a) Runoff
(b) Experiment
Notes: These figures show the return on investment of the best available surebet either over all events, outcomes and
providers during the runoff, or the subset used for the experiment. ROIs greater than 50% or smaller than -5% are
represented by a triangle.
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my experiment contained 77 trades with a total volume of 2,772 contracts. These bets
required an amount of USD 15,989.29 to be deposited as a security which was frozen on
Intrade to compensate for potential losses. Barack Obama’s re-election resulted in a profit
of USD 11,730.71 on Intrade. These characteristics are close to the Trader D’s values in
Rothschild and Sethi [2014], even though this investor had a much larger wallet. The
insights of my experiment open up a new perspective regarding his behavior, which was
probably not risky at all. From my point of view, he used an inter-market, arbitrage-based
strategy similar to mine. If my assumption is correct, then a large share of the profit that
he gained on Intrade was used to compensate his unobserved losses on other providers.
Having discussed surebets in detail, I now turn to the last requirements for arbitrage.
Whether or not the proceeds from the field experiment are able to cover all the costs
accrued in the investigation depends on the dollar-equivalent amount incurred by the
search costs, or, more precisely, the expenses incurred in developing the computer pro-
gram. However, as already discussed in Subsection 5.6, the market would have allowed
for substantially larger investments in exploitable surebets. The exploitable opportunity
available on November 6, 2012, alone, would have covered all the costs incurred, and in
itself confirms that market size permits profitable inter-market surebet strategies.
The surebet strategy employed in this field experiment in inter-market betting was
developed with the objective of excluding any risk of losing money. Even though such
riskless profits might not maximize an investor’s utility function, the expected profit of
risk carrying behavior can be compared to the gains of these exploitable surebets. The
only remaining risk that I am not able to avoid and which, therefore, must be considered is
the insolvency-risk. The importance of considering this risk is demonstrated by Intrade’s
near insolvency in 2013. A short summary on this incidence is given in Appendix A.2.
6 Runoff: Market Analyses
The vigorish values for the ten bookmakers, shown in Table 2, have been calculated for
the primaries as well as for the runoff. These values are highly positively correlated (0.96)
and are on average slightly lower during the runoff. 10Bet has the highest vigorish (10.5%)
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of all bookmakers. Because such a high value indicates that 10Bet offers the worst odds
for at least one outcome, it is not astonishing that 10Bet never offered the back position
for the best available surebet in the market. PinnacleSports offers, as in the primaries,
by far the lowest vigorish of all the bookmakers. However, PinnacleSports’ importance
is low. Even though PinnacleSports features only half as many observations compared
to the most important platforms, the reason for the low level of their importance is that
their low vigorish results from high odds on the outcome 2:Democrats. PinnacleSports is
responsible for 80% of all surebets on 2:Democrats, but their importance is low, because
these surebets do not offer the best ROI in the market. Although the platform’s vig-
orish may be interpreted as indicating lucrative surebets, the odds’ distribution is more
indicative.
Intrade is responsible for almost all best surebets during the runoff. In addition,
Intrade’s average ROI of the best available surebets in the market increase compared with
the primaries. The importance of the platforms vary considerably between the primaries,
the experiment and the runoff. VictorChandler, the most important bookmaker during
the primaries, is negligible throughout the runoff. In contrast, WilliamHill only plays
a significant role during the months close to the election. These variations show that
the selection of bookmakers for the assessment as well as for the observation period has
a significant impact on the markets’ analyses. Even though Intrade is still the most
important prediction market, Observation 3 cannot be verified. The importance as well
as the average ROI of the providers’ best surebets vary strongly, such that I cannot make
generalized statements about a bookmaker’s importance.
Observation 2 identifies, that the slow reaction of some bookmakers to new information
in the market is a typical cause of surebet opportunities. This is also true for some
observations in the runoff and is also in line with the findings of Croxson and Reade
[2011] on games played during the Euro 2008 soccer championship. Croxson and Reade’s
[2011] analyses show that traditional bookmakers (Ladbrokes and WilliamHill) follow the
price discovery of the betting exchange (Betfair). The best examples of these surebets
occurred during the (vice-)presidential debates. Figures 4(a)-(d) show that the odds
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on Intrade were volatile during these specific hours. Most bookmakers appear to have
taken the impact of the debates on the public into account and closed their markets
for a few hours, while other bookmakers offered odds without adjustments during the
debates, and thereby gave rise to high surebet opportunities. During the first presidential
debate (see Figure 4(a)), for example, WilliamHill was the only bookmaker in the field
experiment who was still offering odds on 1:Romney at this point. Once the debate was
over, WilliamHill adjusted the odds slightly. The jump in price of the best available back
offer at the beginning of the second presidential debate occurred because WilliamHill (and
Intertops) stopped offering odds on the presidential election, leaving Ladbrokes as the only
bookmaker in the experiment. Event 2 reveals that Bet365 offered odds on 2:Republicans
during all four debates.
However, slow bookmakers were not the reason for the highest available surebets.
On the contrary, in September 2012 and on election day some bookmakers seemed to
anticipate the downward trend on 1:Romney and 2:Republicans. Bookmakers pushed ρb
downwards several times, which resulted in surebet opportunities with a ROI of up to
10%, and Intrade’s investors adjusted the ρl afterwards. During September 2012 (see
Figure 5(a)), the driving force behind ρb were Ladbrokes and, later on, Sportingbet,
which were together responsible for more than two thirds of the best odds’ changes.
1:Romney underwent more changes than 1:Obama, because the best bookmaker’s odds
change whenever a single bookmaker offers odds that imply a lower chance of winning
than any other bookmaker in the market. In contrast to this, the best bookmaker’s
odds on 1:Obama increases only when the last bookmaker adjusts his odds. In this
case, Intertops is responsible for the first two price jumps, Totesport for the third, and
SkyBet’s odds adjustment on September 27, 2012, resulted in the forth jump. Figure
5(b) shows the development of the winning chances for 1:Obama and 1:Romney on the
election day. At 7 PM EST the first polling stations were closed. The vertical line at
11:15 PM indicates the point in time when the media projected that Barack Obama would
carry the swing-state Ohio. The last vertical line indicates the point in time at which
Mitt Romney congratulates Barack Obama on his successful re-election in his concession
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Figure 4: Information Processing: (Vice-)Presidential Debates
(a) Obama vs. Romney on October 04, 2012 (b) Obama vs. Romney on October 17, 2012
(c) Obama vs. Romney on October 23, 2012 (d) Biden vs. Ryan on October 12, 2012
Notes: This figure shows examples of the information processing of prediction markets and bookmakers during the (vice-
)presidential debates. These televised debates lasted for 90 minutes. The upper volatile line represents ρl; the mostly stable
course is ρb; and the lower volatile line represents the current surebet’s ROI.
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Figure 5: Information Processing: September 2012 and Election Night
(a) September 2012 Odds Development
(b) Election Day’s Odds Development
Notes: This figure shows examples of the information processing of prediction markets and bookmakers in September 2012
and during the election night.
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speech. Although the prices on Intrade implied that 1:Romney remained stable until 9
PM, ρb as well as the price for open lay positions on Betfair and WBX already began
to decrease from 5 PM onwards. Rothschild and Sethi [2014] show in their analyses
that the price on Intrade was shielded by a single large investor who prevented a price
drop. Before this point in time, Ladbrokes offered the best quotes. After this point,
StanJames, together with Sportingbet and PaddyPower, took the lead. StanJames’ quotes
were responsible for the changes in ρb until 10 PM, when StanJames closed its markets.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, I provide evidence that arbitrage opportunities in inter-market online bet-
ting exist and can be exploited. I wrote an algorithm which observed the minute-by-
minute odds on the 2012 U.S. Presidential Election for 4 prediction markets and a total
of 22 bookmakers. The primaries served as a trial period which enabled me to confirm
that the most important requirements concerning arbitrage opportunities are fulfilled. As
a field experiment, I acted as an arbitrageur in the market during the runoff to the election
and invested over USD 25,000 in surebets. Besides establishing a sure mean ROI of 6.8%
on these bets, I identified the costs and risks of this arbitrage-based strategy. On balance,
a sure profit of USD 1,630 resulted. The strategy’s set-up was such that all risks, except
the insolvency-risk, were eliminated. The total costs were almost all fixed costs, and thus
became increasingly smaller as the amount of investment increased with available surebet
opportunities.
The market size and the ROIs of the surebet opportunities that were available during
these events outweighed the remaining risks and personal opportunity costs incurred in
writing the required algorithm. I conclude that my hypothesis is verified, and that this
market offered arbitrage opportunities. In addition, I show that arbitrage opportunities
persistently exist and that they can be found and exploited with moderate effort. A
crucial condition for this finding to hold is that these sure and riskless profits need an
inter-market approach which, includes bookmakers as well as prediction markets. Even
though I show that riskless profits are exploitable, I do not state that this strategy is
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optimal and that investors should actually avoid risk at all costs.
Media attention, new information which becomes continuously available, potential in-
fluence of the odds on voting behavior, and, for example, the number of upcoming events
are all factors that differentiate political betting from sports betting. Therefore, the
results’ application regarding the persistence and the level of available arbitrage opportu-
nities on sports events remains uncertain. In addition, I judge market accessibility and,
for example, the transaction costs only from the perspective of a Swiss resident. However,
regarding the cost structure of adopting an arbitrage-based strategy this paper provides
concrete and applicable values.
In contrast to the existing literature, where the authors only use data on past events, I
not only show that sufficient information on current arbitrage opportunities is available at
negligible variable search costs, but also identify the accessibility of the involved markets.
This becomes important with regard to the fact that only 6 out of 22 observed bookmakers
satisfied the requirements for placing bets with them according to my suggested arbitrage-
based strategy.
Even though I do not use the odds in order to predict the event’s outcome, I highlight
that the odds’ flexibility on one betting platform might be restricted because of the prices
offered on other platforms and, therefore, by the law of one price. For example, the
contract prices on Intrade might not fully absorb new information, because the odds on
other platforms are conditioned by price adjustments caused by arbitrageurs.
Finally, my suggested arbitrage-based strategy offers new insights into the possible
objectives that some investors may have, in view of the puzzling behavior that they
exhibit when only observing the investments on one platform. For example, the strategy
of one individual (Trader D) analyzed by Rothschild and Sethi [2014] seems to be very
risky at first sight. However, this individual has probably placed investments according
to my strategy and, thereby, exploited inter-market arbitrage opportunities.
It would be interesting to investigate whether or not my suggested strategy is generally
applicable to sports betting. Further research on identifying information leaders within
the market and combining information from bookmakers’ and exchanges’ quotes with
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opinion polls might enhance the discussion on forecasting the underlying event’s outcome.
However, this paper demonstrates that it is worth taking a step back in order to look at
the online betting market as a whole, rather than focusing on a single provider.
Appendix 45
A Appendix
A.1 Detailed Trading Information
D
at
e/
B
et
N
r.
L
ay
P
ro
vi
de
r
L
ay
Si
ze
L
ay
C
ha
nc
e
L
ay
In
ve
st
L
ay
T
ot
al
In
ve
st
B
ac
kP
ro
vi
de
r
B
ac
kI
nv
es
t
B
ac
kC
ha
nc
e
B
ac
kT
ot
al
In
ve
st
P
ro
fit
R
ep
.
W
in
R
O
I
R
ep
.
W
in
P
ro
fit
R
ep
.
L
os
e
R
O
I
R
ep
.
L
os
e
Surebets on 2:Republicans
05/12 Intr 36 38.0% 223.2 Inter 120 33.3% 16.80 4.90% 16.80 4.90%
1 223.2 120 16.8 4.90% 16.8 4.90%
06/05 Intr 1 45.1% 5.49 888 3.82 38.2% 0.70 7.50% 0.69 7.41%
12 45.1% 65.88 888 45.8 38.2% 8.32 7.45% 8.32 7.45%
35 45.0% 192.5 888 133.58 38.2% 23.90 7.33% 23.92 7.34%
888 1.8 38.2% 2.92 162.00% -1.80 -100.00%
46 45.0% 253 B365 173.32 42.2% -15.55 -3.65% 33.68 7.90%
2 44.0% 11.2 B365 7.68 42.2% -0.68 -3.59% 1.12 5.93%
1 43.1% 5.69 -5.69 -100.00% 4.31 75.75%
2 533.76 366 13.91 1.55% 70.24 7.81%
06/07 Intr 1 45.7% 5.43 888 4 40.0% 0.57 6.04% 0.57 6.04%
5 45.7% 27.15 888 20 40.0% 2.85 6.04% 2.85 6.04%
3 32.58 24 3.42 6.04% 3.42 6.04%
06/15 Intr 5 45.4% 27.3 888 20 40.0% 2.70 5.71% 2.70 5.71%
3 45.4% 16.38 888 12 40.0% 1.62 5.71% 1.62 5.71%
2 45.3% 10.94 888 8 40.0% 40 1.06 5.60% 1.06 5.60%
6 45.3% 32.82 Inter 24 40.0% 3.18 5.60% 3.18 5.60%
101 45.2% 553.48 Inter 404 40.0% 428 52.52 5.49% 52.52 5.49%
4 640.92 468 61.08 5.51% 61.08 5.51%
06/18 Intr 2 45.2% 10.96 888 8 40.0% 1.04 5.49% 1.04 5.49%
1 45.0% 5.5 888 4 40.0% 0.50 5.26% 0.50 5.26%
1 45.0% 5.5 888 4 40.0% 0.50 5.26% 0.50 5.26%
5 21.96 16 2.04 5.37% 2.04 5.37%
06/19 Intr 3 45.0% 16.5 888 12 40.0% 1.50 5.26% 1.50 5.26%
6 16.5 12 1.50 5.26% 1.50 5.26%
06/26 Intr 5 44.9% 27.55 888 20 40.0% 2.45 5.15% 2.45 5.15%
1 44.9% 5.51 888 4 40.0% 0.49 5.15% 0.49 5.15%
4 44.8% 22.08 888 16 40.0% 1.92 5.04% 1.92 5.04%
7 55.14 40 4.86 5.11% 4.86 5.11%
07/11 Intr 5 43.2% 28.4 WHill 19.05 38.1% 2.56 5.39% 2.55 5.37%
9 43.1% 51.21 WHill 34.25 38.1% 4.45 5.20% 4.54 5.31%
8 79.61 53.3 7.00 5.27% 7.09 5.33%
07/11 Intr 5 43.1% 28.45 WHill 19.05 38.1% 2.51 5.28% 2.50 5.26%
130 43.0% 741 WHill 495.15 38.1% 63.62 5.15% 63.85 5.17%
9 769.45 514.2 66.13 5.15% 66.35 5.17%
07/12 Intr 120 43.1% 682.8 WHill 457.14 38.1% 60.05 5.27% 60.06 5.27%
74 43.0% 421.8 WHill 281.86 38.1% 36.22 5.15% 36.34 5.16%
10 1104.6 739 96.27 5.22% 96.40 5.23%
07/13 Intr 10 43.2% 56.8 WHill 38.1 38.1% 5.11 5.39% 5.10 5.37%
11 56.8 38.1 5.11 5.39% 5.10 5.37%
07/16 Intr 1 43.1% 5.69 WHill 3.81 38.1% 0.50 5.28% 0.50 5.26%
62 43.0% 353.4 WHill 235.83 38.1% 29.82 5.06% 30.77 5.22%
12 359.09 239.64 30.33 5.06% 31.27 5.22%
07/17 Intr 24 43.1% 136.56 WHill 91.43 38.1% 12.01 5.27% 12.01 5.27%
208 43.0% 1185.6 WHill 792.37 38.1% 102.00 5.16% 102.03 5.16%
13 1322.16 883.8 114.02 5.17% 114.04 5.17%
07/18 Intr 15 43.0% 85.5 WHill 57.14 38.1% 7.35 5.15% 7.36 5.16%
5 43.0% 28.5 888 20 40.0% 1.50 3.09% 1.50 3.09%
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14 114 77.14 8.85 4.63% 8.86 4.64%
07/19 Intr 1 41.5% 5.85 WHill 3.81 38.1% 0.34 3.53% 0.34 3.52%
2 41.4% 11.72 WHill 7.62 38.1% 0.66 3.43% 0.66 3.41%
12 41.3% 70.44 WHill 45.71 38.1% 3.84 3.30% 3.85 3.31%
15 88.01 57.14 4.84 3.34% 4.85 3.34%
07/20 Intr 5 41.3% 29.35 WHill 19.05 38.1% 1.61 3.32% 1.60 3.31%
6 41.2% 35.28 WHill 22.86 38.1% 1.87 3.21% 1.86 3.20%
4 40.9% 23.64 WHill 15.24 38.1% 1.13 2.89% 1.12 2.88%
16 88.27 57.15 4.60 3.16% 4.58 3.15%
07/22 Intr 1 41.2% 5.88 WHill 3.81 38.1% 0.31 3.21% 0.31 3.20%
14 41.1% 82.46 WHill 53.33 38.1% 4.20 3.09% 4.21 3.10%
17 88.34 57.14 4.51 3.10% 4.52 3.11%
07/24 Intr 5 41.1% 29.45 888 20 40.0% 0.55 1.11% 0.55 1.11%
18 29.45 20 0.55 1.11% 0.55 1.11%
08/02 Intr 2.25 42.5% 12.9375 888 9 40.0% 0.56 2.56% 0.56 2.56%
6.75 42.5% 38.8125 WHill 24.55 36.4% 4.15 6.55% 4.14 6.53%
WHill 6.38 36.4% 11.17 175.00% -6.38 -100.00%
19 51.75 39.93 15.88 17.32% -1.68 -1.83%
08/02 Intr 8 42.5% 46 B365 32 40.0% 2.00 2.56% 2.00 2.56%
20 46 32 2.00 2.56% 2.00 2.56%
08/17 Intr 2 43.0% 11.4 WHill 7.27 36.4% 1.32 7.08% 1.33 7.12%
13 42.7% 74.49 WHill 47.27 36.4% 8.23 6.76% 8.24 6.77%
21 85.89 54.54 9.56 6.80% 9.57 6.81%
08/17 Intr 17 42.7% 97.41 B365 61.82 36.4% 10.78 6.77% 10.77 6.76%
70 42.6% 401.8 B365 254.55 36.4% 43.66 6.65% 43.65 6.65%
2 42.5% 11.5 B365 7.27 36.4% 1.22 6.51% 1.23 6.55%
100 4.24 576 B365 363.64 36.4% 60.37 6.42% 60.36 6.42%
22 1086.71 687.28 116.03 6.54% 116.01 6.54%
08/17 Intr 15 43.0% 85.5 B365 54.55 36.4% 9.96 7.11% 9.95 7.10%
23 85.5 54.55 9.96 7.11% 9.95 7.10%
08/18 Intr 15 43.0% 85.5 WHill 54.55 36.4% 9.96 7.11% 9.95 7.10%
24 85.5 54.55 9.96 7.11% 9.95 7.10%
08/19 Intr 60 42.2% 346.8 Pinn 215.83 36.0% 37.38 6.64% 37.37 6.64%
25 346.8 215.83 37.38 6.64% 37.37 6.64%
08/22 Intr 19 42.2% 109.82 Pinn 67.62 35.6% 12.57 7.09% 12.56 7.08%
26 109.82 67.62 12.57 7.09% 12.56 7.08%
08/24 Intr 2 42.4% 11.52 Pinn 7.09 35.5% 1.38 7.44% 1.39 7.47%
21 42.3% 121.17 Pinn 74.47 35.5% 14.37 7.34% 14.36 7.34%
513 42.2% 2965.14 Pinn 1819.15 35.5% 345.71 7.23% 345.71 7.23%
1 42.1% 5.79 Pinn 3.55 35.5% 0.67 7.18% 0.66 7.07%
27 3103.62 1904.26 362.13 7.23% 362.12 7.23%
08/24 Intr 8 42.1% 46.32 Pinn 28.37 35.5% 5.31 7.11% 5.31 7.11%
28 46.32 28.37 5.31 7.11% 5.31 7.11%
Surebets on 1:Romney
07/11 Intr 5 41.5% 29.25 WHill 19.05 38.1% 1.71 3.53% 1.70 3.52%
16 41.4% 93.76 WHill 60.93 38.1% 5.25 3.39% 5.31 3.43%
24 41.3% 140.88 WHill 91.42 38.1% 7.68 3.30% 7.70 3.31%
29 263.89 171.4 14.64 3.36% 14.71 3.38%
07/24 Intr 62 40.0% 372 WHill 236.19 38.1% 11.81 1.94% 11.81 1.94%
30 372 236.19 11.81 1.94% 11.81 1.94%
07/25 Intr 28 40.1% 167.72 WHill 106.67 38.1% 5.62 2.05% 5.61 2.04%
31 167.72 106.67 5.62 2.05% 5.61 2.04%
08/17 Intr 61 42.6% 350.14 WHill 221.82 36.4% 38.05 6.65% 38.04 6.65%
32 350.14 221.82 38.05 6.65% 38.04 6.65%
08/17 Intr 15 42.6% 86.1 Inter 54.55 36.4% 9.36 6.66% 9.35 6.65%
60 42.5% 345 Inter 218.45 36.4% 37.29 6.62% 36.55 6.49%
33 431.1 273 46.65 6.63% 45.90 6.52%
08/26 Intr 62 43.8% 348.44 WHill 225.45 36.4% 46.10 8.03% 46.11 8.03%
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34 348.44 225.45 46.10 8.03% 46.11 8.03%
08/27 Intr 112 43.9% 628.32 Lad 389.57 34.8% 102.12 10.03% 102.11 10.03%
35 628.32 389.57 102.12 10.03% 102.11 10.03%
09/09 Intr 112 42.4% 645.12 Lad 361.3 32.3% 113.61 11.29% 113.58 11.29%
36 645.12 361.3 113.61 11.29% 113.58 11.29%
10/04 Intr 51 33.3% 340.17 WHill 113.33 22.2% 56.49 12.46% 56.50 12.46%
37 340.17 113.33 56.49 12.46% 56.50 12.46%
10/23 Intr 88 41.7% 513.04 Lad 293.33 3.3% 73.62 9.13% 73.63 9.13%
112 41.5% 655.2 Lad 373.33 3.3% 91.46 8.89% 91.47 8.89%
52 41.3% 305.24 Lad 173.34 33.3% 41.44 8.66% 41.42 8.65%
38 1473.48 840 206.52 8.93% 206.52 8.93%
11/04 Intr 46 35.4% 297.16 Lad 106.15 23.1% 56.67 14.05% 56.69 14.06%
39 297.16 106.15 56.67 14.05% 56.69 14.06%
Notes: This table provides details on the experiment’s trades. LaySize contains the number of contracts bought on Intrade.
Chance corresponds to the winning probability implied by the offered prices. LayInvest and BackInvest show the USD
amount invested on Intrade or against a Bookmaker, respectively. The resulting profit and ROI are, according to the
definition of a surebet, independent of the election’s outcome.
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A.2 Intrade’s Near Insolvency in 2013
Having closed its services to U.S. citizens in January 2013 due to legal requirements,
Intrade’s Board of Directors announced on its website on March 10, 2013 that:
With sincere regret we must inform you that due to circumstances recently
discovered we must immediately cease trading activity on www.intrade.com.
Later, on April 5, 2013, Intrade’s director Ronald Bernstein reported:
We have now concluded the initial stages of our investigations about the fi-
nancial status of the Company, and it appears that the Company is in a cash
‘shortfall’ position of approximately $700,000 when comparing all cash on
hand in Company and Member bank accounts with Member account balances
on the Exchange system. [...] We are now very confident about the reasons
which caused the current circumstance of the Company; however, for legal
reasons we are not yet at liberty to document them to you. I can confirm
that the Company, if it is able, intends to vigorously pursue two substantial
monetary claims against two distinct parties for an aggregate amount greater
than $3,500,000. Because of these circumstances, the Company has now con-
tacted all members with account balances greater than $1,000, and proposed
a ‘forbearance’ arrangement between these members and the Company, which
if sufficient members agree, would allow the Company to remain solvent.
Finally, Intrade was able to remain solvent and handle the withdrawal requests, but the
marketplace has subsequently remained inactive.
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Chapter II
Calling LABUYLA’s Bluff:
Empirical Evidence on a Cheating
Auctioneer
Abstract. This paper analyzes the modified price reveal auction mechanism used by
LABUYLA. Unusual for a pay-to-bid auction format, labuyla.ch provides sufficient public
information for potential bidders to calculate the auctioned article’s current hidden price
for free. However, intense bidding activities indicate that most bidders are not aware of
this valuable information. I compare the empirically observed behavior with the results
of a model which adopts the framework of LABUYLA’s auction design and includes
asymmetrically informed bidders. My analyses and investigations lead to only one possible
conclusion: The auctioneer was cheating by participating in the auctions as seller, bidder
and buyer.
Keywords: pay-per-bid auctions; countdown clock; asymmetric information; hidden price;
in-auction fraud
Jelclass: D44
54 Chapter II: Calling LABUYLA’s Bluff
1 Introduction
The LABUYLA Holding AG (registered office in Switzerland) sold selected new electronic
products on labuyla.ch by means of a slightly modified price reveal auction. I provide
empirical evidence that LABUYLA used thousands of fake accounts to participate in their
own auctions as seller, bidder and buyer. After disclosing that I had called their bluff by
revealing the source of their innovative auction design’s success, LABUYLA rapidly shut
down their auction platform.
In a price reveal auction, the auction house itself auctions off its own products. An
auction starts at a publicly announced price, which typically equals the item’s retail price.
The current sales price is not publicly observable. However, it is known that the current
sales price is non-increasing over time and decreases by a fixed amount for each submitted
bid. The term ‘bid’ might be misleading, since in the context of price reveal auctions,
bidding actually means that the bidder pays a fee to the auctioneer. In return, this bidder
becomes privately informed about the hidden price and has an option to buy the item
immediately at the revealed current price pt. As soon as one bidder buys the item at the
revealed price, the auction ends.
The hidden price has a key function in a price reveal auction. The value of the
information on the current price as well as the value of the option to purchase the item
are the bidders’ incentives to bid and, therefore, to pay the requested fee. Since this fee
exceeds the price decrease per submitted bid, the auctioneer’s profit rises as the sales
price decreases.
The auction design used by LABUYLA is a modification of the typical price reveal
auction, such as, for example, the ones provided by dealwonders.com or dubLi.com. De-
tailed links and information on these platforms’ availability are given in Appendix A.6.
The modifications concern two crucial points in particular: Firstly, labuyla.ch publicly
displays the nickname of the last bidder for all ongoing auctions. This information can be
used to determine pt without any money transaction taking place and was the stimulus
for the present research. Secondly, every auction has an associated countdown clock that
is independent of the number of bids submitted. When the clock expires, the auction
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is closed without selling the item. Note that in such a case the auctioneer retains the
revenue he receives from all submitted bids. A screenshot of an auction on labuyla.ch is
given in Figure 1. This figure shows the auction type (EASY; see Section 4.1 for type
descriptions), the countdown clock, the last bidder’s nickname, as well as the retail price,
or starting price respectively, of a particular auction.
Figure 1: Screenshot of an Auction on labuyla.ch
The unique auction design used by LABUYLA has not been discussed in the literature.
I set up an asymmetric model and determine the optimal strategy of a bidder who knows
pt during the whole auction period. I validate the major assumptions and the suggested
optimal strategy by comparing the model’s results with the empirical behavior on the
website. In order to do so, I recorded the bidders’ actions on the website for over three
months and show how an individual becomes informed about an item’s current price for
free.
The behavioral analyses provide evidence that the largest share of the observed actions
were performed by accounts owned by LABUYLA and, therefore, provide evidence on a
cheating auctioneer.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I discuss the related
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literature on pay-per-bid auctions. Section 3 provides a model of an asymmetric price
reveal auction with a ‘hard close’ ending rule and studies the optimal strategy of a bidder
who can observe pt for free. Section 4 discloses the origin of the data and summarizes the
dataset. Section 5 discusses the model’s assumptions regarding the observable behavior.
In Section 6, I provide evidence that LABUYLA participated in their own auctions as
seller, bidder and buyer. While Section 7 concludes this paper’s findings, Section 8 shares
a brief anecdote about the consequences that these research results had for LABUYLA’s
operations.
2 Literature
The rising popularity of online auctions has encouraged various studies on fraudulent
forms of behavior that bidders, sellers or the auctioneers have adopted. Several studies
(Aleem and Antwi-Boasiako, 2011; Ockenfels et al., 2006; Dong et al., 2009; Jenamani
et al., 2007; Chua and Wareham, 2008) point out different types of fraud and discuss how
to detect and prevent them. These investigations show that fraud prevention often focuses
on e-commerce businesses that are similar in form to eBay and conclude that the auction-
eer is situated in the best position to fight this type of fraudulent behavior (Snyder, 2000;
Ockenfels et al., 2006). If, however, an auction house itself is the cheat, then it is much
more difficult to detect and reduce the fraud. One branch of this literature investigates
in-auction fraud; i.e., fraudulent behavior that occurs during a running auction. Phantom
betting (Wang et al., 2000; Graham et al., 1990; Deltas, 1999) is such an example and
describes an activity where the auctioneer places a bid when only one bidder is left in the
auction and thus places a flexible reserve price.
In pay-per-bid auctions, as the name suggests, bidders have to pay a fee to the auc-
tioneer for each bid they place. The three most commonly used types are:
Penny auctions open at a ridiculously low price. However, outbidding the standing bid
by only one penny is tied to a fee. Such auctions use a ‘soft close’ ending rule with
an automatic run-time expansion for every subsequent bid. Finally, a typical penny
auction ends with one lucky winner who buys the item at a very low sales price
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and numerous unsuccessful bidders who suffer a monetary loss. Robinson et al.
[2013] provide an introduction to penny auctions and discuss, among other things,
opportunities for fraud. Penny auctions have inspired several research papers, such
as Platt et al. [2010] and Augenblick [2014], which theoretically and empirically
analyze this non-traditional auction design. Byers et al. [2010] extend the literature
by introducing asymmetric bidders’ beliefs about model parameters.
Lowest unique bid auctions (e.g., Rapoport et al., 2009) use a ‘hard close’ ending rule
where each bidder can submit costly bids before a publicly announced deadline is
reached. At the auction’s end, the bidder who submitted the lowest unique bid
wins the item. The sales price is typically very low and the winner makes a good
bargain. Nonetheless, numerous unsuccessful bidders suffer a monetary loss. O¨stling
et al. [2011] provide a theoretical and empirical analysis of the bidding behavior in a
similar auction design where the lowest unique positive integer submitted wins the
auction.
Price reveal auctions are descending price auctions which open at a reasonable retail
price. In contrast to a Dutch auction, the standing sales price depends on the number
of previously submitted bids and is not solely a function of time. To attract bids,
the current price is hidden. By placing a costly bid, which is simply a euphemism
for paying a fee, the bidder becomes privately informed about the current sales
price. He then has, for a limited time, the option to buy the item. The final sales
prices are typically not as low as in other pay-per-bid auctions. However, price
reveal auctions stand out from other pay-per-bid auctions, because the uncertainty
is limited to the hidden sales price. Every bidder has the opportunity to end the
auction whenever he places a bid and receives the signal on the current price. The
auctioneer profits from the fact that the price reduction from a submitted bid is
lower than the collected fee which the bidder paid to place the bid. Gallice [2010]
sets up the theoretical framework for the price reveal auction and investigates some
of its properties.
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All these pay-per-bid auctions share the feature that the auctioneer does not really
care about the item’s final sales price, because, on average, his collected fees by far exceed
the given discount. In addition, these auctions seem to be particularly susceptible to
cheating auctioneers who could place the winning bid themselves. These auction types
operate in a gray area and their selling mechanism is legally questionable. In Germany
as well as in Switzerland, penny auctions are, for example, classified as lotteries and are
illegal in their present form (e.g., VGH Baden-Wu¨rttemberg, 2013).
The present paper was additionally inspired by the book Snipers, Shills, and Sharks:
eBay and Human Behavior by Steiglitz [2007] in which Steiglitz analyzes observable be-
havior on eBay from an auction theory perspective.
3 Model of an Asymmetric Price Reveal Auction with
a ‘Hard Close’ Ending Rule
This model is based on the auction design used on labuyla.ch. In this section’s analy-
sis of an asymmetric price reveal auction, I assume that one bidder observes an item’s
current price for free and dub him the ‘informed bidder’. All other bidders have to buy
the information on the current price from the auctioneer by placing bids. I justify this
assumption by the following two facts: (1) I show in Subsection 5.2 that any attentive
observer can become informed about pt without expense; and (2), I show in Subsection 5.3
that the intense bidding activity on the platform implies that almost certainly no bidder
has used this information. Investigating the reasons why the observed bidders pay for the
information on pt rather than calculating this value for free is beyond the scope of this
paper. I will treat these individuals as ‘noise bidders’. In the finance literature, irrational
noise traders can provide needed liquidity to the market. Bloomfield et al. [2009] provide
an overview of the different interpretations of the term ‘noise traders’ and the motivation
behind their behavior. The presence of noise bidders is a major prerequisite for the success
of this auction design. If every bidder would be informed free of charge about pt, then no
one would have an incentive to bid and, therefore, the price would never decrease.
In this paper, I investigate the decision problem of an informed bidder who participates
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in an auction solely with noise traders. In order to increase comparability with Gallice’s
work, I use some of his notation. This section is structured as follows. In Subsection 3.1, I
set up the theoretical framework. Subsection 3.2 determines the informed bidder’s optimal
strategy. Subsection 3.3 summarizes the model implications. Finally, Subsection 3.4
provides two model extensions, each of which addresses one assumption-driven implication
of the derived informed bidder’s optimal strategy.
3.1 Theoretical Framework
A single item is sold in an asymmetric price reveal auction with a hard close ending rule.
The auction ends if the item is either sold, or the deadline is reached. The variable t
stands for the number of seconds left until the deadline of the auction, and T stands for
the initial runtime (in seconds). The current price pt is not public information for all
t < T . The auctioneer publicly announces four items of information: The initial price pT ,
the remaining duration of the auction t, the cost c for the privately issued information on
pt, and, finally, the amount ∆ that pt is lowered for every subsequent bid.
The current price is determined by the linear function pt = pT −∆ηt, where ηt is the
number of times that the hidden price was revealed at a specific point in time. To prevent
a profitable strategy by which one bidder drives the current price down to zero from being
exploited, c > ∆ > 0 must hold. By assuming that pT is a multiple of ∆, zero is a possible
current price and ensures that that pt takes no negative values.
Bidder i assigns a valuation of Xi to the object. Each Xi is non-negative as well as
independently and identically distributed according to the increasing distribution func-
tion F . Bidder i knows the realization xi of Xi and that other bidders’ valuations are
independently distributed according to F .
The bidders’ behavior can be characterized by four actions, namely: wait, in order to
observe the auction process while maintaining the option to place a bid at a later time;
bid, in order to reveal the hidden price and receive the opportunity to buy the item; buy
the item at the current price and thereby ending the auction; and, permanently exit an
auction.
In more detail, playing bid at time t has four implications, which instantly take place:
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1. The bidder pays c to the auctioneer.
2. The bidder becomes privately informed about pt −∆.
3. The bidder can either buy the item at the revealed price and thereby end the auction,
or decline this option and, instead, either wait or exit.
4. The displayed name of the last bidder in this auction changes.
Two types of bidders who are asymmetrically informed about the current price par-
ticipate in this auction. On the one hand, an informed bidder knows pt for free during
the whole auction period. On the other hand, the current price is unknown to all other
bidders except for the moment t when they play bid.
The following three assumptions aim to reduce the length of the informed bidder’s
optimization problem. I discuss the model assumptions regarding the empirical behavior
in Section 5.
Sequential order of actions prevents the need for a tie-breaking rule and for consid-
ering simultaneous actions. I assume that the informed bidder is able to react
promptly to any price changes and that he has the ability to buy the item at the
last moment before the auction closes (t = 0). Noise bidders arrive according to
any discrete probability distribution where the probability of having two or more
arrivals at the same time is zero; as given for example, by a Poisson distribution
[Ross, 2010, page 316].
Deterministic behavior of the noise bidders excludes strategic decisions. An in-
coming noise bidder draws his private valuation xi. He always plays bid and becomes
informed about the current price pt−∆ at which he can buy the item. If pt−∆ ≤ xi,
he takes the action buy. Otherwise, he exits the market. This assumption implies
that noise bidders never take the option wait.
Exactly one informed bidder implies, along with the noise bidders’ deterministic be-
havior, that the informed bidder faces a decision problem instead of a game with
strategic interaction.
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3.2 Strategy of the Informed Bidder
The informed bidder does not gain any new information by playing bid. Therefore, he is
able to determine in advance which of the action combinations bid and buy, bid and wait,
or bid and exit is best. As a result of the assumption c > ∆ and the deterministic behavior
of the noise bidders, the informed bidder’s action bid and wait is strictly dominated by
wait at any point in time. The action wait weakly dominates exit, as no time costs occur
in the model and playing wait until the auction ends is thus equal to exit. However, by
playing wait, the bidder retains the option of taking the action bid and buy at a later
stage.
For each combination of the current price pt and the remaining time t, the optimal
strategy is the answer to the question: Which of the remaining actions, either wait or bid
and buy, maximizes the informed bidder’s expected profit? If the informed bidder plays
bid and buy, he receives the payoff xi − pt − c¯, where c¯ ≡ c−∆. Playing wait results, at
least in the short run, in one of the following three situations: (1) No noise bidder arrives;
(2) A noise bidder arrives and plays bid and buy; or, (3) A noise bidder arrives and plays
bid and exit.
In order to describe the informed bidder’s decision problem, I define three probabilities:
pi1(n, t) is the probability that exactly n noise bidders arrive in the remaining t seconds
of the auction.
pi2(n, t) is the probability that at least n noise bidders arrive in the remaining t seconds
of the auction.
pi3(n, pt) is the probability that none of the next n noise bidders buy the item with
respect to the current price they reveal.
Note that: (1) pi2(n, t) = 1−∑n−1i=0 pi1(i, t); (2) pi3(n, pt) = ∏ni=1 F (pt−i∆), pi2(n+1, t) =
pi2(n, t)− pi1(n, t); and, (3) pi3(n+ 1, pt) = pi3(n, pt)F (pt − (n+ 1)∆).
For all combinations of pt and t, the highest price at which the informed bidder decides
to play bid and buy is denoted as his optimal buy-price b∗pt,t. The optimal strategy is
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directly derived from the optimal buy-price, because b∗pt,t < pt implies the action wait,
and b∗pt,t ≥ pt implies bid and buy. I do not use an index on the potential buy-price b,
because this value always refers to the informed bidder.
Suppose that pt ∈ (p, p¯), where p¯ ≡ xi− c¯ and p is the price that solves (xi− pt− c¯) =
pi3(1, pt)(xi − pt − c¯ + ∆). In this range the current price is most interesting. If pt ≤ p,
then the informed bidder’s optimal action is to play bid and buy, because the risk that
the next noise bidder purchases the item outweighs the potential gain of a lower price. In
contrast, if pt ≥ p¯, then the informed bidder’s optimal action is to wait for at least one
further bidder, because a purchase is not profitable at the current price.
The current price decreases in discrete steps to a minimum of zero. I define nb (pt) ≡
max
(
0, pt−bpt,t∆
)
, which is the minimum number of bids needed to reduce the current price
such that bpt,t ≥ pt − nb (pt) ∆ holds. Furthermore, nx(pt) is the lowest positive integer
that fulfills p¯ − [pt − nx (pt) ∆] ≥ 0. As long as fewer than nx (pt) bidders arrive, the
informed bidder is better off by not buying the item. The expected profit of the informed
bidder for any possible price bpt,t is given by:
u(pt, t, bpt,t) =pi2(nb, t) {pi3(nb, pt) [p¯− bpt,t] + [1− pi3(nb, pt)] · 0}
+
nb−1∑
i=nx
pi1(i, t) {pi3(i, pt) (p¯− pt + i∆) + [1− pi3(i, pt)] · 0}
+ [1− pi2(nx, t)] · 0
=pi2(nb, t)pi3(nb, pt) (p¯− bpt,t)
+
nb−1∑
i=nx
pi1(i, t)pi3(i, pt) (p¯− pt + i∆) . (1)
The first line represents the expected profit if at least nb uniformed bidders arrive
before the auction ends. If the first nb of them played bid and exit, then the informed
player could buy the item at price bpt,t and gain the profit p¯−bpt,t. The second line captures
the cases where the current price does not reach bpt,t until the end of the auction, but
where at least nx noise bidders arrived. If none of these noise bidders played bid and
buy, then the informed bidder should buy the item at t = 0. The third line completes
the possible scenarios, where the informed bidder’s best choice at t = 0 is to not buy the
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item.
The informed bidder’s strategy is a complete plan of action (described by b∗pt,t) for
every possible combination of state variables pt and t with respect to his private valuation
xi, the distribution function F, and the parameters ∆ and c.
Proposition 1. The optimal buy-price b∗t>0 is independent of the remaining time t and
the current price pt.
The proof is given in Appendix A.1. The situation changes at t = 0 when the informed
bidder has a final chance to purchase the item. He should then buy the item if p¯−p0 ≥ 0.
If b∗t>0 6= b∗t=0, then the optimal buy-price will immediately jump at the last possible
moment before the auction ends.
3.3 Discussion of the Model’s Result
The informed bidder’s willingness to pay jumps at the last moment of the auction which
might seem strange at first sight. The model implies that an informed bidder should
calculate his optimal buy-price b∗t>0, which does not change until the countdown clock
reaches zero. While t > 0, he purchases the item if pt ≤ b∗t>0. At the last moment of
the auction, when the clock reaches zero, he buys the item if the utility of the purchase
is non-negative, or p0 ≤ p¯, respectively. This result is driven by the assumptions about
the deterministic behavior of the noise bidders and the infinitely fast reaction time of the
informed bidder.
The jump at the last moment, or the late buy, has nothing to do with a sniping strategy
(Roth and Ockenfels, 2002; Ockenfels and Roth, 2006; Ariely et al., 2005; Hossain, 2008;
Chakraborty and Kosmopoulou, 2004). Sniping is a strategy used to prevent other bidders
from learning and adjusting their valuation of the product. However, in my model no
strategic interaction between bidders exists, and bidders know their precise valuation of
the item. In fact, the reason for the jump in the optimal buy-price is the option to buy
the item at a later point in time, whenever no further noise bidders arrive. As long as
this option exists and the arrival of an additional uniformed bidder is desirable for the
informed bidder, his best action is wait. The option expires at the last moment of the
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auction, and this causes the jump in the optimal buy-price.
3.4 Model Extensions
The first extension aims to avoid the case where the informed bidder’s valuation is so high
that he buys the item right at the start of the auction, such that b∗t>0 = pT . I introduce an
outside option to buy the same item and assume that 2∆ > c holds. The item is thereby
unlimitedly available at the retail price pT in a store and can be purchased without any
additional costs. These two additional assumptions reflect the auction design used by
LABUYLA.
In a second extension, the informed bidder’s submission of the bid and purchase order
will probably not be successful. This uncertainty prevents the counter-intuitive jump in
the optimal buy-price at the last possible moment before the auction ends.
3.4.1 Outside Option to Purchase the Item at a Store
The behavior of the noise bidders is basically the same. The only difference is that if they
arrive and the auction is already closed, then they buy the item at the store if xi > pT .
Therefore, the informed bidder’s strategy is not influenced by the change in the noise
bidder’s behavior. However, the informed bidder takes the introduced outside option into
account if xi > pT , and either η0 = 0 or an uniformed bidder were to have bought the
item.
Proposition 2. If t > 0 and xi > pT , then the additional option of buying the item at a
fixed price increases the informed bidder’s expected profit.
The proof is given in Appendix A.2. If no noise bidder arrives, then the informed
bidder can purchase the item at the online store at price pT instead of buying the item
at the auction at price pT + c¯. In addition, he can purchase the item at the online store
if a noise bidder bought the item in the auction. This option leads to a lower optimal
buy-price b∗t>0. If t = 0, the informed bidder buys the product in the auction if the item
has not been sold and at least one noise bidder has arrived; otherwise, he buys the product
at the online store. This result is ensured by the assumption that 2∆ > c. If xi ≤ pT ,
then the option is useless for the informed bidder, and the basic model can be used.
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3.4.2 Uncertain Bid Submission
The bid of an informed bidder is still certain to be submitted if t > ω¯. However, suppose
that if t ∈ [0, ω¯], the bid and purchase order of an informed bidder is submitted with
probability t
ω¯
. I further assume that noise bidders arrive according to a Poisson process
with mean λ per second.
This newly introduced uncertainty means that the action wait becomes costly during
the last ω¯ seconds of the auction. Thus, if the informed bidder’s best option is wait, how
long should he wait for a noise bidder to arrive? The action bid and buy is compared to
the wait option with the highest expected profit. I define ω∗pt as the optimal buy-time
if no additional noise bidder arrives. Suppose a noise bidder arrives z ∈ [0, ω¯] seconds
before the auction’s deadline and plays bid and exit. In this case, the expected profit of
an informed bidder playing his best strategy is Ω∗z,pt , which must be at least as high as
the expected profit from submitting a bid right away, or z
ω¯
(p¯− pt + ∆), respectively.
The first term in Equation 2 represents the profit if no further noise bidder arrives and
the informed bidder purchases the item ωpt seconds before the auction ends. The second
term represents the expected profit if a noise bidder arrives, conditional on the point in
time when he arrives.
Ωt,pt = e−λ(t−ωpt )
ωpt
ω¯
(p¯− pt) +
∫ t
ωpt
λe−λ(t−z)pi3(1, pt)Ω∗z,pt−∆dz. (2)
In order to derive ω∗pt , I take the following three steps: Firstly, I consider only current
prices which fulfill pt ∈ (p, p + ∆] and t ∈ [0, ω¯]. I show that in these cases ω∗pt is
independent of t. Secondly, I prove that if t ∈ [0, ω¯], then ω∗pt is generally independent of
t for all pt ∈ (p, p¯). Therefore, ω∗pt does not depend on the possibility that the informed
bidder might prefer to wait for more than one additional noise bidder. Finally, I show
that ω∗pt as well as the implied strategy is valid even if t > ω¯.
Proposition 3. If pt ∈ (p, p + ∆] and t ∈ [0, ω¯], then ω∗pt is independent of t and strictly
positive.
The proof is given in Appendix A.3. Whenever ω∗pt < t, the expected profit of the
action wait exceeds the profit of playing bid and buy, and vice versa. In other words, the
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value of the option wait is positive if ω∗pt < t and equals zero if ω∗pt ≥ t.
Proposition 4. If t ∈ [0, ω¯], then ω∗pt is generally independent of t for all pt ∈ (p + ∆, p¯).
Proposition 5. Proposition 4 is also true for t > ω¯.
The proofs are given in Appendix A.4 and A.5, respectively. Because waiting is costly,
the informed bidder’s willingness to pay increases as the deadline approaches. At a current
price less than or equal to p, the informed bidder’s best action is to play bid and buy. If
the current price exceeds p, then he should wait for at least one further bidder, as long as
t > ω∗pt . Note that ω∗pt ∈ (0, ω¯) and ω∗pt decreases as pt increases. Uncertainty about the
successful transaction of the bid submission eliminates the counter-intuitive jump of the
informed bidder’s willingness to pay close to the auction’s end.
4 Empirical Data
I have collected the empirical data for two reasons: Firstly, I wanted to use the dataset
to check whether the bidders’ behavior appears to be non-optimized from an external
perspective and thereby supports the model’s assumption on the deterministic behavior
of the uninformed bidders; Secondly, I wanted to show how the current price can be
calculated by only using publicly available information. As this precluded the option of
asking the owner about the data, I recorded all the auction activities that occurred on
labuyla.ch myself.
4.1 Data Collection
The labuyla.ch start page displays the 9 auctions with the currently lowest t, while auc-
tions with a higher current t are listed on subsequent pages. As shown in Figure 1, the
product name, a picture of the item, the auction type (c and ∆), the nickname of the
last bidder, and the value pT as well as t are easily visible for each auction. Whenever
a bidder reveals the hidden price, all other potential bidders can observe this action be-
cause the displayed name of the last bidder changes, accompanied by an eye-catching red
flash. Precisely this succession of the displayed bidder’s nicknames enabled me to collect
a comprehensive dataset of the bidding activities on labuyla.ch.
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A closer look at the transmitted source code of the website shows a structured HTML
code. Every auction carries a unique identification number, which is specified in a specific
section of the source code. Moreover, all the public information recorded in the dataset is
freely available and explicitly tagged. I collected and stored the data by using an algorithm
programmed in JAVA. The algorithm assigned the stored values to the website’s source
code by processing the data in an infinite loop. If the identification number was not
found in my database, all the information of the auction was saved. On the contrary,
if the identification number had been previously recorded in the database, the current
nickname of the last bidder was then compared with the nickname of the last bidder in
the dataset. If they were different, the current nickname of the last bidder as well as t
were added to the dataset.
At the end of March 2010, I noticed a change in the bidding behavior. Before this
date, nearly all bids took place in the 9 auctions with the currently lowest t. Subsequent
to this date, bidders revealed the hidden price in an earlier stage of the auction (higher
t). My first algorithm captured only the activities in the last 9 auctions, which are
displayed on the website’s start page. This procedure was sufficient to record nearly all
the bids performed on the platform in accordance with the old behavior. However, I
had to respond to the new betting behavior by adjusting the algorithm. The adjusted
algorithm also checked and recoded bids in auctions listed on the second to tenth page.
The algorithm requires less than 0.2 seconds to call up the source code of a single URL,
compare the information with the database, and finally save any new information (1
cycle). While the first algorithm called up the start page in every cycle, the adjusted
algorithm called up the start page either every 0.2 or 0.4 seconds. On the other hand,
a cycle evaluated the current information on the second page every 0.8 seconds, and the
third to tenth pages were called up every 32 seconds. Whenever more than one bid on a
specific auction occurred between two page requests, no more than one bid was recorded.
In addition, labuyla.ch presents all the auctions that ended with a purchase in their
bestseller list. The bestseller list includes, among other things, the nickname of the buyer
as well as the buy-price. I recorded and matched this list with the observed bidding
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behavior in the database in order to verify the algorithm’s observation accuracy.
4.2 Dataset Summary
In the period from the 12th of March 2010, 18:16:03, to the 14th of June 2010, 02:48:02,
I observed and recorded the bidding behavior on labuyla.ch. During this observation
period, I logged 523,837 actions on the platform. These actions were either of type S
(start of a new auction), BW (bid and wait), or BB (bid and buy). An auction was
labeled as incomplete if at least one of the following criteria was true:
• At least one bid was already made (last bidder’s name was not ‘None’) when the
algorithm detected the auction.
• The auction took place in an interval, where the observation was interrupted.
• The buyer specified in the bestseller list did not match the last bidder recorded by
the algorithm.
Incomplete auctions were eliminated from the dataset. LABUYLA runs three types
of auctions: EASY (c = 0.95; ∆ = 0.50), BIG (c = 9.50; ∆ = 8.00) and CRAZY
(c = 95.00; ∆ = 90.00). In the following analyses, except for Subsection 6.2, only auctions
of type EASY are analyzed, which includes 14,940 of the 19,739 auctions recorded in total.
Auctions of type EASY accounted for more than 95% of all purchased items and for more
than 99% of all actions. This final dataset, which only contains complete auctions of type
EASY, is termed τ .
4.3 The Algorithm’s Observation Accuracy
Even though an auction is categorized as complete, the applied algorithm cannot guaran-
tee – either because several bids occurred between two page requests or because a single
bidder revealed the hidden price several times in a row – that all bids were recorded. The
buy-price, recorded in the bestseller list, provides information on the true number of bids
in this auction. Therefore, by comparing this value to the number of nickname changes
detected by the algorithm, I determine the algorithm’s observation accuracy. The basis
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for this analysis are all the auctions in the dataset τ in which the auctioned articles were
sold.
Figure 2: The Algorithm’s Observation Accuracy
Share of auctions
M
is
se
d 
bi
ds
 p
er
 a
uc
tio
n
maximum
average
0%
20
%
40
%
60
%
80
%
10
0%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Figure 2 presents the share of observed bids in relation to the true number of bids.
This figure shows that in 33% of these auctions all bids were observed, and in 90% of
these auctions at least 75% of all bids were observed. On average, the algorithm missed
less than 10% of all bids. Therefore, most of the submitted bids were recorded.
4.4 Classification of Subsets
As mentioned before, I had to adjust the algorithm with regard to a change in the bidding
behavior. To illustrate this change, Figure 3 summarizes the daily bidding behavior.
For every day (04:00 a.m. to 03:59 a.m.) this figure shows the minimal, the maximal
and the average t of the recorded actions BW . The doubling of the average, and maximal
t from one day to another can be seen. After a closer look at the daily data from the end
of March, I ascribe this change in behavior to the 26th of March 2010, 17:29:25. During
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Figure 3: Change in Bidding Behavior and Subset Classification
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this day the recording algorithm worked properly and no problems requiring mention were
observed. My adjustment of the algorithm is the reason for the second partition on the
11th of April 2010, 20:10:20.
According to these two insections, I split the dataset τ into the three subsets τ1 (old
behavior and first algorithm), τ2 (new behavior and first algorithm), and τ3 (new behavior
and adjusted algorithm). Table 1 shows the number of observed actions in each subset.
5 Discussion of the Model’s Assumptions Regarding
the Observable Behavior
I use the empirical dataset to discuss the model’s major assumptions in Section 3.1 that are
essential for evaluating the theoretical findings. In addition, I use the observed behavior
to improve the strategy of an informed bidder’s interaction on labuyla.ch and discuss
alternative explanations of the observed bidding behavior.
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Table 1: Number of Actions in Each Subset
Dataset S BW BB ∑
τ1 2,298 88,496 92 90,886
τ2 1,920 86,369 118 88,407
τ3 10,722 293,627 737 305,086
τ 14,940 468,492 947 484,379
Notes: This table contains the number of started auctions (S), the number of bids placed without buying the item (BW),
and the number of purchases (BB). The dataset τ is subdivided into τ1, τ2 and τ3 with respect to the applied recording
algorithm and the bidders’ behavior.
The bidders’ private valuations of an auctioned product are not observable. For this
reason, I define the term profit in this section as follows: Profit equals the discount on
purchases minus the expenditures on placing bids, and thus reflects the bidder’s monetary
gain from participating in auctions.
5.1 Becoming an Informed Bidder
The presented model requires the possibility of knowing the current price without any
payment to the auctioneer being necessary. Due to the fact that the algorithm records
the bidding histories of all currently running actions, the information indicating how many
bidders have already revealed the price (ηt) is available for ongoing auctions. Adding this
information to the publicly known values for ∆ and pT reveals the hidden prices on
labuyla.ch.
5.2 No Other Informed Bidder
The model is designed for only one informed bidder. Thus, no other informed bidder
should be present in a typical auction. To identify the bidder’s type, I identify two
characteristics that distinguish an ‘informed’ bidder from a ‘noise’ bidder. I classify a
bidder as potentially informed, if the following two conditions are fulfilled:
1. Profit > 0: A rational and informed bidder profits from his participation in the
auctions. If his expected savings from a lower price do not exceed his expenses for
revealing the hidden price, he could increase his utility by buying all products at
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pT at the online store. On the contrary, the noise bidders follow the given strategy
even if they make a negative profit.
2. Ratio BW:BB ≤ 9: In the model, an informed bidder always plays bid and buy or
wait and thus this ratio should be zero. Nevertheless, I choose 9 as the critical value
in order to account for the fact that on the website a bidder has to pay for at least
10 bids in advance. An informed bidder who wants to buy only one item would
therefore lower the price nine times prior to his purchase.
The dataset τ contains 2,883 different bidders or nicknames, respectively. Of this total,
2,075 bidders played solely the action bid and wait. Because this behavior is exactly the
opposite action that an informed bidder would take, these bidders are classified as noise
bidders. The remaining 808 bidders bought at least one item and are classified according
to their gained profit and their actions’ ratio of bid and wait to bid and buy. Table 2 shows
that 10 bidders feature both characteristics of an informed bidder. Another 9 bidders at
least satisfy the first condition, the profit motive.
Table 2: Identifying Potentially Informed Bidders
BW:BB ≤ 9 BW:BB > 9 Σ
Profit > 0 10 9 19
Profit ≤ 0 0 789 789
Σ 10 798 808
Notes: The 808 bidders who bought at least one item are grouped according to their total gains from the auction and their
BW:BB ratio.
The 10 potentially informed bidders in τ bought a total of 12 items. Even if they are
actually informed bidders, in comparison to the 14,940 recorded auctions, the probability
that one of them buys a particular item is negligible. This insight supports the assumption
that no other informed bidder is involved in the auctions. The result would not change
by assigning the type only according to the bidder’s profit, because the 19 bidders with a
positive profit bought a total of only 23 items.
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5.3 Deterministic Behavior of the Noise Bidders
It is certainly tenable that even a noise bidder should be able to recognize that at least one
bidder has revealed the hidden price by simply checking whether the field which displays
the name of the last bidder is empty. If this supposition is true, then even he should be
able to conclude that the hidden price equals the commonly known price pT . In such a
model, the noise bidder would not make the initial bid, and the informed bidder might
now have an incentive to place the initial bid and ensure that an arriving noise trader will
play bid. However, such a rationale is not in line with the observed bidding behavior.
The underlying assumption that noise bidders observe the hidden price at most once
per auction and play bid without conditioning their actions on the publicly available
auction details or on their private valuations is a simplification in order to shorten the
calculations without losing crucial insight. To validate this simplification, I eliminate the
ten bidders, whom I classified as potentially informed, from τ for the analyzes in this
subsection.
5.3.1 Number of Bids per Noise Bidder Over All Auctions
The histogram in Figure 4 shows the number of bids per noise bidder over all auctions.
Whereas 37 bidders made 1 to 10 bids, and 10 bidders made 11 to 90 bids, 2,826 of the
2,883 bidders, or 98% of all noise bidders, decided to place over 90 bids, resulting in a
negative profit. Aggregated over all noise bidders, the current price was revealed 469,342
times at a price of CHF 0.95. Noise bidders bought the item at the revealed price only
935 times. These facts provide no information about the decision rule or strategy used
by noise bidders. However, arguable implications of the assumed noise bidder’s strategy,
such as negative profits or numerous noise bidders who simply lower the hidden price, are
in line with this observation.
5.3.2 Number of Bids per Noise Bidder per Auction
Purchase the product or exit the market: these are the only actions allowed in the model
for a noise bidder after he has revealed the hidden price. If a bidder reveals the hidden
price more than once, he either bids strategically by taking potential externalities into
account or does not have the sagacity to recognize the information behind the changing
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Figure 4: The Number of Bids per Noise Bidder Over All Auctions
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nickname of the last bidder. My assumptions prohibit multiple bids per noise bidder,
as I neither believe that a noise bidder, whose behavior results in a monetary loss, bids
strategically, nor that he lacks shrewdness.
Analyzing the dataset reveals that in 229,844 cases (73%) a noise bidder bid exactly
once per auction. In 54,258 cases (17%) a noise bidder bid exactly twice per auction, and
in 16,797 cases (5%) a noise bidder revealed the price three times per auction. This result
supports the model’s framework.
5.3.3 Timing of the Noise Bidders’ Actions Bid and Wait
In the model, I do not specify the discrete probability distribution according to which
noise bidders arrive. However, I consider an auction to appear more attractive when t
is low, because the nine auctions with the lowest t are presented on the website’s start
page. As a result, they receive more attention and are likely to have more potential
bidders. Along with the expectation that the hidden price of auctions with a low t has
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been revealed more often, I expect to observe an accumulation of bids in the final minutes
of an auction. The remaining time t after a bid has been placed is represented in Figure 5
and Figure 6. Only bids which took place at a remaining auction time of less than 3,000
seconds are considered.
Figure 5: Timing of the Played Actions Bid and Wait in Each Subset
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Figure 5 distinguishes bids according to the periods τ1, τ2 and τ3 in which they oc-
curred. As in Figure 3, the sudden increase in average t is apparent. Most of the bids
occur around the average value, and no increase in bids appears close to the end of the
auction. By focusing on the exact value of t rather than on the change in behavior, Figure
6 shows peaks at constant intervals. A closer look reveals that each interval is exactly 60
seconds, and the peaks appear in the moments where t is a multiple of 60. This mechani-
cal pattern can be explained neither by the model nor by any adequate justification that
I can identify.
The data could support the model if many items were sold when t is high, enabling
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Figure 6: Number of Played Actions Bid and Wait for Each Value of t ≤ 3, 000
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the lower count of bids at a low t to be explained by the fact that fewer auctions reach
such a low t. To check this argument, Figure 7 shows the time t at which items were sold
according to τ1, τ2 and τ3. This figure misses 6 items that were sold when t < 50 and 12
items that were sold when t > 70.
Purchases are highly concentrated at t = 57 and at the adjoining seconds in all three
periods. Out of a total of 947 items, 915 items were sold when the countdown clock
displayed 56, 57 or 58 remaining seconds. The proposition that hundreds of noise bidders
independently arrive and buy at t ∈ {56, 57, 58} is unrealistic in my opinion.
To account for the conjecture that this observation is the result of a single bidder’s
action, I check the number of items that were bought by a single buyer, on the basis
of their nickname identity. From a total of 785 buyers, 670 buyers bought one item,
100 buyers bought two items and 15 buyers bought three items. No single nickname is
responsible for purchasing more than three items. I thus reject the conjecture that this
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Figure 7: Timing of the Played Actions Bid and Buy
50 52 54 56 58 60 62 64 66 68 70
τ1
τ2
τ3
Remaining time of the auction while playing  bid and buy (t)
Ab
so
lu
te
 fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0
10
0
20
0
30
0
40
0
50
0
phenomena is the result of one single bidder’s strategy.
6 Evidence on a Cheating Auctioneer
The independence of the noise bidders from the environment and their non-optimized
strategy are strong assumptions of the model. The dataset reveals different patterns
in the aggregated bidding behavior which cannot be explained so far. In contrast to
my prediction, the behavior does not appear to be random from an outside perspective.
A repeated structure and focus points are identifiable in the behavior evident in the
dataset. As these data result from empirical observations, these patterns are hard to
arrange subject to the independence assumption. Instead of adjusting the model to these
findings, I check the data for two possibilities where the independence assumption might
be violated.
Until now, I have assumed that every bidder has only one identity on the auction
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platform. From now on I will consider the possibility that a bidder uses multiple nicknames
on labuyla.ch.
6.1 One External Bidder with Multiple Identities
In a theoretical paper, Yokoo et al. [2004] analyze the effects of false-name bids on com-
binatorial auction protocols. They state that identifying bidders who submit false bids
by using multiple e-mail addresses are difficult to detect.
I suppose that one bidder registered more than one nickname on the auction platform,
which allows him to take part in the auctions under different nicknames. Such behavior
might be a reasonable strategy if this bidder gains an advantage from hiding his identity
and his strategy from other bidders or from the auctioneer. If his strategy, for example,
is buy the item 57 seconds before the auction ends if the price at that moment is lower
than the private valuation, this strategy could explain the observed accumulation. Figure 8
summarizes the accounts’ profit, which is calculated as the received discount on purchases
minus the expenditures for bidding. The boxplot on the left-hand side contains only
bidders who bought at least one product at t ∈ {56, 57, 58}. The boxplot on the right-
hand side contains all bidders.
The setting in which one bidder exists who uses hundreds of nicknames and is respon-
sible for the purchases, instead of hundreds of noise bidders who independently arrive
and buy at the same second, is capable of explaining the observed coordinated behavior.
However, two reasons cause me to reject this explanation:
1. Multiple nicknames imply different personal data and shipping addresses. Other-
wise, the strategy only misleads other bidders, but the auctioneer has to tolerate
the strategy.
2. The predominate negative profit, shown in Figure 8, and the large count of the
actions bid and wait of the nicknames who purchased items at t ∈ {56, 57, 58} does
not present a financially rewarding strategy.
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Figure 8: Profit per Bidder from Participating in the Auctions
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6.2 The Auctioneer Directly Influences the Auctions
Another explanation for the observed coordinated behavior which does not face the two
impediments of an external bidder with multiple identities, is an internal bidder (the
auctioneer himself) with multiple identities. Three possible incentives exist which might
induce the auctioneer to participate in the auction while his own nicknames make negative
profits; these incentives are:
1. Playing bid and wait can be profitable if the auctioneer’s bid attracts an observer
to reveal the price. Each of his bid and wait actions costs the auctioneer ∆ if the
item is sold to an external bidder, or is otherwise free. In contrast, from each bid
that is attracted by his own action, the auctioneer earns c¯ if the item is sold to an
external bidder, or c otherwise.
2. Playing bid and buy can also be profitable for the auctioneer. Even though he
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immediately ends the auction and forgoes the possibility of earning money from
noise bidders who subsequently arrive at the auction, such an action hedges the
auctioneer against the risk of selling the product to a bidder at the reduced hidden
price. This protection guarantees that the auctioneer gains a profit of c for all bids
made by external bidders, instead of c¯ per bid if an external bidder buys the item.
3. Another possibility why such a strategy might be profitable can be seen from an
indirect perspective. As owner of the website and developer of this specific auction
design, the auctioneer’s intention is that the platform gives the appearance of pro-
viding an efficient service to the external observer. This appearance of legitimacy
serves to attract more potential bidders and also assists the auctioneer in fulfilling
strategic business objectives.
Profit in this context is the auctioneer’s gains from selling the items through the
auction platform instead of selling them through the online shop. I calculate his profit
by subtracting the discount given for the sold items from the inflated payments gained
by revealing the hidden price. The auctioneer’s profit, shown in Table 3, is based on all
complete auctions of all three types EASY, BIG, and CRAZY.
Table 3: Auctioneer’s Profit from the Price Reveal Auctions
Auction Type Gain (CHF) Discount (CHF) Profit (CHF)
CRAZY 1,140.00 720.00 420.00
BIG 17,708.00 2,787.40 14,920.60
EASY 445,967.00 26,665.40 419,301.60
Σ 464,815.00 30,172.80 434,642.20
Notes: This table shows how much money the auctioneer earned from selling via the auction rather than selling through the
online store; assuming that he does not own any nicknames himself. Gain: Sum of all monetary transactions from bidders
in the auctioneer as a result of the actions BW and BB. Discount: Sum of all differences pT − pt if an item was purchased
at the price pt.
According to the dataset, the auction platform realized a profit of over CHF 430,000
during the observation period (about 3 months). The calculation of the profit is biased
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if the auctioneer owns nicknames. In the worst case for the auctioneer, he owned all the
nicknames that yield a negative profit. In this case, he would have made a loss of CHF
777.30. The counterpart would be if he owned all the nicknames that made a positive
profit, resulting in a profit of CHF 438,750.50.
The auctioneer might act even more fraudulently by playing bid and wait without
lowering the hidden price. However, I rule out such a behavior, as the data, used for
Figure 2, do not contain any case where the calculated buy-price is lower than the buy-
price recorded in the bestseller list.
Even though Aleem and Antwi-Boasiako [2011] discuss many different types of fraud,
they do not cover this type of behavior. LABUYLA’s auction design allows the auctioneer
to act even more fraudulently than by placing phantom bids. While phantom bids would
lower the current price, LABUYLA can close an auction at any point in time by playing
bid and buy.
6.3 Strategy According to the Implications of the Dataset
To outline a profit-promissory strategy where no optimized reservation price must be
calculated, I use the following facts from τ (auctions with no bidders are ignored in
calculating the following values):
1. The probability that an auction ends at t > 60 is below 2%.
2. If at least one bidder played bid and wait, the price p70 is on average 8.6% (standard
deviation: 0.06) below the retail price.
3. During the period t ≤ 70 on average 0.03 bidders arrive and play bid and wait.
An informed bidder should wait until t = 70 and then decide whether he wants to
buy the item at the current price or not to bid at all. I choose the threshold at t = 70,
as this value gives the bidder 10 seconds time to handle all the information and play his
preferred action before the countdown clock reaches 60.
This strategy serves as decision guidance and not as a decision rule. Which price the
bidder should respond to and which action he should take are not definitively determined.
82 Chapter II: Calling LABUYLA’s Bluff
Note that this strategy guidance is based on the observed environment and decreases in
utility if more than one bidder follows the suggestions. Noise bidders who reveal the price
and do not buy the item are essential for a low, and thus attractive, current price to be
reached.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, I set up a model with asymmetric informed bidders who participate in
the modified price reveal auction mechanism used on labuyla.ch and test the theoretical
findings with regard to the empirical behavior. The record of the empirical behavior on
labuyla.ch is an important part of this paper. I demonstrate the possibility of gaining
information on the hidden price without any money transaction taking place. According
to the dataset, of the 2,883 bidders recorded in total, a maximum of 10 are potentially
informed. This strengthens the validation of the model, which assumes that no other
informed bidder exists in a particular auction. Contrary to my expectation, the noise
bidders’ behavior is even more static and mechanical than I assumed. Strictly speaking,
I cannot think of any framework, containing autonomous, real people, that is compatible
with the observed behavior. Three incompatible facts sustain this argument:
1. Almost all bidders who purchased an item did so independently between 56 and 58
seconds before the countdown clock was due to expire.
2. All bidders changed their strategy from the old behavior to the new behavior within
a few minutes.
3. Bidders were attracted by auctions when the current remaining countdown time was
a multiple of 60.
The analysis of empirical behavior, recorded in the dataset, provides only one expla-
nation that I could not reject: Almost all of the nicknames used are not owned by actual
market participants; instead, they are owned by the auctioneer.
Even though the real motivation for such behavior can only be guessed, this explana-
tion alone is in line with the dataset and the observed patterns. This cheating behavior
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of the auctioneer, who sells all the products, is a new type of fraud which allows the
auctioneer to fraudulently increase his profits in nearly every circumstance.
A cheating auctioneer who operates in an anonymous, lottery-like, fast-paced and
legally questionable online environment is definitely not inconceivable. However, this
is the first paper to identify and provide empirical evidence for this type of cheating
auctioneer and complements previously detected types of in-auction fraud.
Further research on comparable auction or selling mechanisms might, therefore, take
fraudulent auctioneer behavior into consideration. In addition, this paper shows that a
new auction design which is prematurely released might provide valuable information.
Valuable either from research perspective, or to gain profit through an information ad-
vantage. Even though labuyla.ch provided a potentially unique modification of a price
reveal auction, I am sure that this is not the only platform which suffers such misconduct.
8 Closing Remarks
Once I had completed the data analysis, I tried to acquire more evidence in support of the
supposition that the auctioneer owns nicknames and interacts in the auctions. I wrote
an email to Mr. Merkli (Managing Director of LABUYLA Switzerland) and explained
that my interest in contacting the management of LABUYLA was for the purpose of
acquiring information for a scientific paper that I was writing on the auction design of
LABUYLA. I also asked whether the company could provide me with a dataset of the
website’s activities for the purpose of analyzing empirical behavior. A day later, Mr. Perri
(Managing Director of LABUYLA Germany) called me by phone and tried to establish
exactly what I was investigating in my study and invited me to their office in Stuttgart.
Mr. Perri welcomed me on June 21, 2010 and presented LABUYLA’s business plan
to me. This presentation included a preview of the new homepage layout, which he said
would be online in a few weeks. He said that further adjustments still needed to be made
to the auction platform, but that the operating homepage still provided the possibility of
buying an item at the online store and at an auction. Mr. Perri regretted that he was
unable to give me any data on the activities taking place on the auction platform. He
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justified this by saying that they had not yet integrated a system for collecting such data
and therefore possessed no such information.
I had prepared two graphs of my data for this meeting (details of Figure 4 and Figure
6). I confronted Mr. Perri with these patterns and asked him whether he had any
explanation of how these patterns might have occurred. He was unable to give me any
reason for why such coordinated behavior occurred. Mr. Lewandowski (Communications
Designer) joined us, but could not explain the pattern either. They asked me for my
interpretation of how the pattern occurred. I answered that my findings result in only
one possibility; namely, that the auctioneer owns nicknames and places bids. The talk
stagnated at this point, as Mr. Perri mentioned a few times that such a behavior would
not only be illegal, but would not produce any profit. Since he emphatically repeated
that such a strategy would not be profitable, I explained how such behavior might indeed
be profitable. The discussion was terminated with his admission that they had tried such
a strategy in April 2009 (when they launched the auction platform), but that they had
lost over CHF 20,000 within a few months, thus proving how unprofitable such a strategy
is.
A few weeks after this conversation, LABUYLA launched its new homepage. But
instead of the version they had shown me, the new homepage no longer featured the
possibility of buying an item in an auction. Since then, LABUYLA has published no
explanation for why the items are now only on sale at a fixed price in the online store.
They have simply shut down their auction platform, which had generated a profit of over
CHF 430,000 in three months, and they would certainly not have closed such lucrative
platform if the auctioneer had not owned multiple nicknames.
In its judgment of December 04, 2012 SHAB [2012], the district court of Meilen
(Switzerland) declared LABUYLA Holding AG subject to bankruptcy proceedings; and
so, the company was dissolved.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. First suppose that t > 0 and thus the probability that at least one further noise
bidder arrives is positive. uˆ(b) = u(pt, t, b¯) − u(pt, t, b), where b¯ ≡ b − ∆, describes the
gain from waiting for an additional noise bidder instead of buying the item at some price
b. If uˆ(b) is positive, the noise bidder should wait. If uˆ(b) is negative, then the noise
bidder should either buy the item as soon as the price reaches b or check whether he can
do better by choosing a higher b.
uˆ(b) =u(pt, t, b¯)− u(pt, t, b)
=pi2(nb + 1, t)pi3(nb + 1, pt) (p¯− b+ ∆)
+
nb∑
i=nx
pi1(i, t)pi3(i, pt) (p¯− pt + i∆)
− pi2(nb, t)pi3(nb, pt) (p¯− b)−
nb−1∑
i=nx
pi1(i, t)pi3(i, pt) (p¯− pt + i∆)
=pi3(nb, pt) [pi2(nb, t)− pi1(nb, t)]
{
F (b¯) (p¯− b+ ∆)− (p¯− b)
}
=pi3(nb, pt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
[pi2(nb, t)− pi1(nb, t)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
{
F (b¯)∆−
[
1− F (b¯)
]
(p¯− b)
}
. (3)
The informed bidder’s decision depends only on the sign of the term in curly brackets
and is independent of the time t and the current price pt. In order to identify the optimal
b, I take a closer look at the sign of the last term. If b is such that this term is less than
or equal to zero, then for any b > b′ this term is strictly negative, because F (b − ∆) >
F (b′−∆) and (p¯− b) < (p¯− b′). The sign of the term in curly brackets is either negative
for all b or changes at most once from positive to negative. Along with the fact that
uˆ(∆) < 0, either b∗ = pT , if uˆ(pT ) < 0, or the optimal price fulfills uˆ(b∗) ≤ 0 and
uˆ(b∗ + ∆) > 0.
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. If t > 0 and xi > pT , then the informed bidder’s problem described in Equation
(1) can be described as
u(pt, t, b) = pi2(nb, t)pi3(nb, pt) (p¯− b) +
nb−1∑
i=1
pi1(i, t)pi3(i, pt) (p¯− pt + i∆)
+ pi2(nb, t) [1− pi3(nb, pt)] (xi − pT )
+
nb−1∑
i=0
pi1(i, t) [1− pi3(i, pt)] · (xi − pT ) .
As before, I calculate the gain if an additional informed bidder arrives.
uˆ(b) = pi3(nb, pt) [pi2(nb, t)− pi1(nb, t)]
{
F (b¯)∆−
[
1− F (b¯)
]
(p¯− b)
}
+ pi3(nb, pt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
[pi2(nb, t)− pi1(nb, t)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
[
1− F (b¯)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(xi − pT )︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
. (4)
Equation 4 is strictly larger than Equation 3 and, therefore, the additional option
increases his expected profit.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. The FOC of Equation 2, with Ω∗z,pt−∆ =
z
ω¯
(p¯− pt + ∆), is
∂Ωt,pt
∂ωpt
= e
−λ(t−ωpt )
ω¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
{(p¯− pt) + [(p¯− pt)− pi3(1, pt)(p¯− pt + ∆)]λωpt}︸ ︷︷ ︸
!=0
and thus
ω∗pt =
1
λ
(p¯− pt)
pi3(1, pt)(p¯− pt + ∆)− (p¯− pt) > 0.
This result implies that ω∗pt is independent of t and strictly positive. The SOC evaluated
at ω∗pt is negative, and therefore ω∗pt is a maximum.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Assume that pt ∈ (p + ∆, p + 2∆]. Proposition 2 implies two things: Firstly,
∂ω∗pt
∂pt
< 0 and thus ω∗pt < ω∗pt−∆; Secondly, Ω∗z,pt−∆ =
z
ω¯
(p¯− pt + ∆),∀z ∈ (0, ω∗pt−∆). Thus
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Equation 2 can be written as:
Ωt,pt = e−λ(t−ωpt )
ωpt
ω¯
(p¯− pt)
+
∫ t
ω∗
pt−∆
λe−λ(t−z)pi3(1, pt)Ω∗z,pt−∆dz
+
∫ ω∗
pt−∆
ωpt
λe−λ(ω
∗
pt−∆−z)pi3(1, pt)
[
z
ω¯
(p¯− pt + ∆)
]
dz. (5)
ω∗pt maximizes Equation 2 as well as Equation 5 and thus does not depend on the possibility
that the informed bidder might prefer to wait for more than one additional noise bidder
for all pt ∈ (p + ∆, p + 2∆]. This argument can be used iteratively and thus holds for all
pt ∈ (p, p¯).
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. Three possible cases exist if t > ω¯.
1. If ω∗pt < ω∗pt−∆ ≤ ω¯, then only the second term of Equation 5 changes.
2. If ω∗pt ≤ ω¯ < ω∗pt−∆, then Equation 5 changes to:
Ωt,pt = e−λ(t−ωpt )
ωpt
ω¯
(p¯− pt)
+
∫ t
ω∗
pt−∆
λe−λ(t−z)pi3(1, pt)Ω∗ω¯,pt−∆dz
+
∫ ω∗
pt−∆
ω¯
λe−λ(ω
∗
pt−∆−z)pi3(1, pt)(p¯− pt + ∆)dz
+
∫ ω¯
ωpt
λe−λ(ω¯−z)pi3(1, pt)
[
z
ω¯
(p¯− pt + ∆)
]
dz.
3. If ω¯ < ω∗pt < ω∗pt−∆, then the informed bidder’s best action is to play bid and buy
right away.
In all cases, the maximization still results in the same ω∗pt or the same strategy.
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A.6 References to Websites
I often refer to content on labuyla.ch, which (for the reasons explained in this paper) does
not exist anymore:
http://www.labuyla.ch/liveAuction/all/, retrieved July 05, 2010;
http://www.labuyla.ch/liveAuction/bestseller/10/, retrieved July 05, 2010;
http://www.labuyla.ch/liveAuction/testAccount/, retrieved July 05, 2010.
Screenshots of these sites are available from me upon request. In addition, I refer to
the auction design provided by dealwonders.com and dubLi.com. These two websites do
not exist anymore, or no longer offer a price reveal auction:
http://www.dealwonders.com/, retrieved July 10, 2010;
http://global.dubli.com/, retrieved July 10, 2010.
Advertising spots for the price reveal auction which they offered are available (retrieved
September 18, 2014) on:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6UbSbkKiNhc, dealwonders.com;
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SLHtQcbTyQs, dubLi.com.
Bibliography 89
Bibliography
Aleem, A. and Antwi-Boasiako, A. (2011). Internet Auction Fraud: The Evolving
Nature of Online Auctions Criminality and the Mitigating Framework to Address the
Threat. International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice, 39 (3), 140–160.
Ariely, D., Ockenfels, A. and Roth, A. E. (2005). An Experimental Analysis of
Ending Rules in Internet Auctions. RAND Journal of Economics, 36 (4), 890–907.
Augenblick, N. (2014). Consumer and Producer Behavior in the Market for Penny
Auctions: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis. Revise and Resubmit: Review of
Economic Studies.
Bloomfield, R., O’Hara, M. and Saar, G. (2009). How Noise Trading Affects Mar-
kets: An Experimental Analysis. Review of Financial Studies, 22 (6), 2275–2302.
Byers, J. W., Mitzenmacher, M. and Zervas, G. (2010). Information Asymmetries
in Pay-Per-Bid Auctions: How Swoopo Makes Bank. CoRR, abs/1001.0592.
Chakraborty, I. and Kosmopoulou, G. (2004). Auctions With Shill Bidding. Eco-
nomic Theory, 24 (2), 271–287.
Chua, C. E. H. and Wareham, J. (2008). Parasitism and Internet Auction Fraud: An
Exploration. Information and Organization, 18 (4), 303–333.
Deltas, G. (1999). When Does Cheating on Mail-In Bids Pay? A Guide for the Dishonest
Auctioneer. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 40 (3), 313–323.
Dong, F., Shatz, S. M. and Xu, H. (2009). Combating Online In-Auction Fraud:
Clues, Techniques and Challenges. Computer Science Review, 3 (4), 245–258.
Gallice, A. (2010). Price Reveal Auctions on the Internet. Carlo Alberto Notebooks
147, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
Graham, D. A., Marshall, R. C. and Richard, J.-F. (1990). Phantom Bidding
Against Heterogeneous Bidders. Economics Letters, 32 (1), 13–17.
90 Chapter II: Calling LABUYLA’s Bluff
Hossain, T. (2008). Learning by Bidding. RAND Journal of Economics, 39 (2), 509–529.
Jenamani, M., Zhong, Y. and Bhargava, B. (2007). Cheating in Online Auction —
Towards Explaining the Popularity of English Auction. Electronic Commerce Research
and Applications, 6 (1), 53–62.
Ockenfels, A., Reiley, D. and Sadrieh, A. (2006). Online Auctions. NBER Working
Papers 12785, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
— andRoth, A. E. (2006). Late and Multiple Bidding in Second Price Internet Auctions:
Theory and Evidence Concerning Different Rules for Ending an Auction. Games and
Economic Behavior, 55 (2), 297–320.
O¨stling, R., Wang, J. T.-y., Chou, E. Y. and Camerer, C. F. (2011). Testing
Game Theory in the Field: Swedish LUPI Lottery Games. American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics, 3 (3), 1–33.
Platt, B. C., Price, J. and Tappen, H. (2010). Pay-to-Bid Auctions. NBER Working
Papers 15695, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Rapoport, A., Otsubo, H., Kim, B. and Stein, W. E. (2009). Unique Bid Auction
Games. Working Paper No. 2009,005, Jena Economic Research Papers.
Robinson, S. G., Giebelhausen, M. D. and Cotte, J. (2013). Shopping, Gambling
or Shambling? Penny Auctions. Journal of Business Research, 66 (9), 1612–1616.
Ross, S. M. (2010). Introduction to Probability Models. Academic Press, 10th edn.
Roth, A. E. and Ockenfels, A. (2002). Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending
Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet .
American Economic Review, 92 (4), 1093–1103.
SHAB (2012). Notice no: 6974050, December 13, 2012, Schweizerisches Handelsamts-
blatt, shab.ch.
Bibliography 91
Snyder, J. M. (2000). Online Auction Fraud: Are the Auction Houses Doing All They
Should or Could to Stop Online Fraud? Federal Communications Law Journal, 52 (2),
Article 8.
Steiglitz, K. (2007). Snipers, Shills, and Sharks: eBay and Human Behavior. Princeton
University Press.
VGH Baden-Wu¨rttemberg (2013). Judgment of May 23, 2013, 6 S 88/13, juris.de.
Wang, R., Dinlersoz, E. M. and Bag, P. K. (2000). More on Phantom Bidding.
Economic Theory, 15 (3), 701–707.
Yokoo, M., Sakurai, Y. and Matsubara, S. (2004). The Effect of False-Name Bids
in Combinatorial Auctions: New Fraud in Internet Auctions. Games and Economic
Behavior, 46 (1), 174–188.

Chapter III
Analyzing the Behavior and
Influence of Accurately Identified
Shill Bidders in Online Auctions
Abstract. By merging data files containing the personal details of bidding agents
with millions of bidding histories, this is the first paper that has succeeded in accurately
identify shill bidders in online auctions and analyze their behavior. I show that the
identified shill bidders influenced 0.35% of the observed auctions. Moreover, I calculate
the shill bidders’ gains and monetize the auctioneer’s incentive to overlook price-pushing
shills. The behavior of the majority of these accurately identified shill bidders does not
fulfill any of the criteria for the shill bidder types discussed in the literature. Nevertheless,
I adopt two algorithms which aim to identify shill bidders based on public information.
On average, these approaches assign a higher probability of being a shill bidder to the
accounts of the bidders who were accurately identified as shill bidders in my dataset.
However, the possibility of reliably identifying shill bidders and honest bidders is limited.
Keywords: online auction; shill bidding; in-auction fraud; bidding behavior
Jelclass: D12; D44
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1 Introduction
Shill bidding describes the behavior of a seller who bids in his own auctions with an
intention, for example, to drive up the sales price or to avoid the official reserve price’s
insertion fee. The anonymity of the web facilitates this type of fraudulent activity, because
even an attentive observer would hardly be able to assign a user account to a specific
individual. “The most crucial issue is that online identities are easily created and cannot
be tracked back to the physical identities without inside information” [Ockenfels et al.,
2006, p. 25]. The auctioneer, however, has access to the participants’ personal details,
and is therefore typically in the best position to prevent shill bidding.
The auctioneer’s main source of revenue from sold articles is the final value fee. A
bonafide warning that shill bidding is prohibited might encourage more aggressive bidding
behavior, thereby increasing the auctioneer’s profit. Unfortunately, the auctioneer faces
conflicting incentives in deciding whether or not to actually fight this fraudulent behavior.
On the one hand, he could disregard bidding misconduct in order to personally profit from
the price-pushing shill bids. On the other hand, his reputation as a trusted auctioneer is
at stake.
Several studies (e.g., Trevathan and Read, 2007; Engelberg and Williams, 2009; Kauff-
man and Wood, 2005; Ford et al., 2013; Dong et al., 2010) have recognized this incentive
problem and have developed approaches, based on bidding histories and further public
information, to tackle misconduct of this kind. Their algorithms successfully identify
shill bidders’ accounts in their training datasets. However, owing to the lack of field data
which document proven shill bidders, it is difficult to verify the precision of their suggested
approaches.
This paper is based on empirical data which contain almost two million bidding histo-
ries, the individuals’ maximum bid, as well as the users’ personal details (e.g., full postal
address and phone number). By comparing the seller’s and bidders’ personal details in
each auction, these data allow me to identify obvious shill bids. I use the term ‘ob-
vious’ shill bids, because the provided account information is sufficient to identify shill
bidder accounts with certainty.
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The recorded auctions took place on the online auction platform ricardo.ch. Ricardo.ch
AG is a Swiss subsidiary of the multinational media company Naspers. With over 3 million
user accounts and 20,000 articles sold per week, ricardo.ch operates the most frequently
used auction platform in Switzerland.
Auctions on ricardo, like those on eBay, follow the rules of an ascending English
auction and offer the possibility of proxy bidding. An ascending English auction starts at
a previously defined reserve price. The auctioneer then raises the price as long as more
than one bidder signals his willingness to pay the currently announced price. If only one
bidder remains, then this bidder wins the auction at the current price. Such auctions are
concluded in a short time, and the bidders’ cost of attending the auction is negligible. In
contrast, online auctions take place over several days. Bidders do not attend the auction
all the time, and returning to the website in order to place a bid is costly in terms of
time. The proxy bidding system aims to account for this inconvenience and expense by
automatically placing bids up to an entered maximum value.
This paper enhances the existing literature with insights on the behavior of accurately
identified shill bidders. I show that current shill bidding has many guises and that iden-
tifying the underlying strategies used is difficult. This finding is supported by the limited
success of identification algorithms which are based on specific patterns of behavior. In
addition, I calculate the influence of obvious shill bids on the rent’s distribution. Besides
estimating the honest bidders’ loss, I focus on the auctioneer’s monetary incentive to
overlook shill bids, because the final value fee he collects is often used as an argument for
the observable persistence of shill bids.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the related
literature and outlines previous findings. In Section 3, I describe the data collection in
more detail and summarize my acquired dataset. Section 4 analyzes the behavior of
the accurately identified shill bidders, investigates the success of prohibiting obvious shill
bidders, and estimates the auctioneer’s monetary gain from shill bids. In Section 5, I
apply two shill-bidder identification algorithms to my data in order to check whether they
identify the shill bidders my approach accurately identified. As most studies on online
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auctions use data about behavior on eBay, Section 6 compares the summary statistics of
the bidding behavior on ricardo with equivalent figures on eBay (USA) auctions presented
by Hayne et al. [2003]. The aim of this section is to evaluate to what extend the findings
about shill bidding on ricardo can be applied to eBay. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature
The rising popularity of online auctions has recently entailed an abundance of studies in
this field (Ockenfels et al., 2006; Aleem and Antwi-Boasiako, 2011). One branch of this
literature investigates in-auction fraud; i.e., the fraudulent behavior of any participant
during a running auction. Such fraudulent behavior can emanate either from the auction
house (e.g., Bag et al., 2000), from bidders (e.g., Sher, 2012; Chen and Tauman, 2006),
or from the seller (e.g., Chakraborty and Kosmopoulou, 2004; Izmalkov, 2004; Hlasny,
2006). The latter contains shill bidding.
2.1 Motivating Shills
Shill bidding describes the fraudulent in-auction behavior of a single individual, who
influences the auction by using multiple accounts in order to submit bids (Yokoo et al.,
2004). Even though auctions exists where potential buyers shill bid to hide their purpose
(Sher, 2012; Yokoo et al., 2004), I use the term ‘shill bid’ in this narrower sense and
focus only on sellers who bid on articles they are selling. Shills can differ with regard to
the sellers’ motivation and actions (e.g., Kaur and Verma, 2013; Kauffman and Wood,
2003; Engelberg and Williams, 2009; Watanabe and Yamato, 2008; Izmalkov, 2004): (1)
Reserve-Price Shilling occurs early in the auction and ensures a minimum price, without
paying the fees associated with an official reserve price; (2) Buy-Back Shilling occurs late
in the auction and is aimed at prohibiting the sale of the article; (3) with Competitive
Shilling, the seller continuously outbids the highest bidder (up to a certain amount); (4)
Discover-and-Stop Shilling (which I describe below); (5) creating phony feedback to inflate
reputation; or, for example, (6) exposing the bidders’ valuation for a subsequent offer.
The Discover-and-Stop strategy is based on eBay’s proxy bidding rules (Engelberg and
Williams, 2009). Suppose the current highest bidder H entered bH as his maximum bid
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and the minimum increment is ∆. Later on, another bidder A enters the amount bA as his
maximum bid. Therefore, four cases are possible: (1) if bH ≥ bA + ∆, then the standing
price increases to bA+∆, and H is still the highest bidder; (2) if bA+∆ > bH ≥ bA, then the
standing price increases to bH , and H is still the highest bidder; (3) if bH + ∆ > bA > bH ,
then the standing price increases to bA, and A becomes the highest bidder; or, (4) if
bA ≥ bH + ∆, then the standing price increases to bH + ∆, and A becomes the highest
bidder. Whenever the second case is observed (H remains the highest bidder, but the
standing price increases to less than bA + ∆), then bH has been discovered and the shill
bidder stops placing shills.
2.2 Models Which Include Shill Bidding
Chakraborty and Kosmopoulou [2004] analyze shill bidding incentives in a common value
auction setting where the probability that the seller can participate in his own auctions is
exogenous and common knowledge. They show that bidders cannot be fooled in equilib-
rium, because they correctly anticipate the seller’s potential participation and, therefore,
bid less aggressively. Since the equilibrium strategies imply that the seller sometimes
wins an auction, the possibility of shill bidding lowers the expected payoff for buyers and
sellers. In contrast, the auction house, which only cares about the sales price and not
about who wins the auction, gains from shill bidding.
Chakraborty and Kosmopoulou [2004] mention that the toleration of shill bidders po-
tentially affects the auctioneer’s long-run profitability due to reputation losses. However,
they do not consider reputation effects in their model. Kosmopoulou and Silva [2007]
provide experimental evidence for this model. In line with the model’s findings, they
show that bidders bid less aggressively if they believe that shill bidders are present.
Izmalkov [2004] investigates the implications of a shilling seller who sells a single object
to asymmetric buyers in a private values setting by means of an English auction. His main
finding is that “there exists an equilibrium of the English auction with shill bidding that
is outcome equivalent to the optimal mechanism of Myerson [1981]” [Izmalkov, 2004, p.
1]. In addition, he discusses several issues, such as resale possibilities, which should be
considered in real-life applications.
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2.3 Evidence of Shill Bidding in Online Auctions
Although shill bidding is strictly prohibited, court rulings (Schwartz and Dobrzynski,
2001) prove that this behavior distorts the course of numerous online auctions. Further-
more, the anonymity provided by internet auctions facilitates shilling and is additionally
advantaged when the auction house permits multiple accounts per person. Auction houses
have an important role to play in preventing shill bids. Along with bidding histories, they
have exclusive access to the personal data of all the accounts. Therefore, the auctioneer
should be able to link accounts and detect obvious shill bidders.
The fact that auction houses might have insufficient incentives to fight shill bidding
has prompted several studies which attempt to identify shill bidders based on observable
bidding behavior. These studies estimate that the share of auctions that are influenced
by shill bidders potentially ranges between 1% and 10% (Ockenfels and Roth, 2006).
However, this range must be treated with caution, because some of these studies (e.g.,
Engelberg and Williams, 2009) base this share only on auctions with more than one bidder,
while other studies refer to ‘questionable bids’ instead of shill bids (e.g., Kauffman and
Wood, 2003).
2.4 Attempts to Identify Shill Bidders on the Basis of Bidding
Histories
In this section, I will briefly outline the approaches taken by four studies to identify shill
bidders. Without access to personal details, these authors use the bidders’ observable
behavior as a proxy for shilling. These studies suggest ‘shilling variables’ which capture
suspicious bidding characteristics and describe how to calculate and condense them into
a ‘shill score’ or into a shill probability, respectively. They test their approaches either
on simulated or empirical auction data and successfully identify shill bidders according to
their specific strategy.
• Trevathan and Read [2005] developed an algorithm which calculates a shill score
based on six shilling variables. This shill score indicates whether a seller and a specific
buyer are engaged in collusive shill-biding behavior. In Trevathan and Read [2007], they
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extend their approach in order to identify sellers who use multiple accounts to place shill
bids. Their suggested collusion score combines the shill score with dependencies among
nicknames using a graph theory approach.
• Engelberg and Williams [2009] show that eBay’s proxy bidding design allows for a
Discover-and-Stop strategy. By incremental bidding, a shill bidder can at times discover
the maximum bid of the highest bidder and stop bidding just below this value. Based
on bidding behavior characteristics, they estimate that 1.39% of all bids on eBay are
placed according to their identified Discover-and-Stop strategy and are therefore shills.
Engelberg and Williams [2009] use a probit model to validate their suggested shilling
variables. Moreover, they experimentally demonstrate the profitability of the Discover-
and-Stop strategy and highlight the associated risk of accidentally becoming the highest
bidder. They became the highest bidder in 16 out of 46 Discover-and-Stop attempts and
won 7 out of 30 auctions.
• Kauffman and Wood [2005] use premium bids as a proxy for shills. A premium bid
is a bid which is placed at an auction while another auction exists on the same article at
a lower current price. They find that premium bidding occurs in 23% of all auctions in
their dataset.
• Ford et al. [2013] developed an algorithm based on a feed-forward, back-propagation
neural network in order to detect suspicious bidders. Suspicious bidders can then be
analyzed in more detail by an external shill verifier. Such a shill verifier is, for example,
suggested by Dong et al. [2010] who use an approach based on the Dempster-Shafer theory
of evidence.
3 Data
In 2013, Naspers owned three additional European auction houses besides ricardo.ch,
namely: ricardo.gr (operating in Greece, closed on May 5th, 2014); qxl.dk (operating
in Denmark, sold in the autumn of 2013); and qxl.no (operating in Norway, sold in the
autumn of 2013). Along with ricardo.ch, these four auction houses formed the ricardo
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Group. As their auction platforms all used the same software, all of them unintentionally
submitted the highest bidder’s maximum bid in each auction to the browser of each
observer along with the auction’s bidding history. In addition for ricardo.ch and ricardo.gr,
the personal details of every account were publicly available. This unique opportunity to
accurately identify obvious shill bidders owing to the accessibility of personal details is
the reason for my focus on auctions that took place on ricardo.
3.1 Origin of the Data
In order to display dynamically changing contents in a user’s browser, the ricardo Group’s
websites use ‘Asynchronous JavaScript and XML’ (AJAX) requests. In practice, this
means that whenever ricardo.ch is addressed, then: (1) the browser receives a source
code which contains placeholders; (2) the browser requests the current values for those
placeholders from the server; (3) the server replies those values; and (4) the browser
combines all information in order to display the requested website.
In December 2013, I noticed that very valuable information was submitted by ri-
cardo.ch’s server in response to the implemented AJAX requests. Along with the public
variables’ values (e.g., nickname), the server submitted personal details such as the user’s
postal address or his (mobile) phone number. Whenever an individual was browsing ri-
cardo.ch’s auctions, the browser received the personal details of all participating users.
Even though this confidential information was not displayed in the browser, its submission
clearly breaches data protection rules. Privacy protection concerning the account data
is not only in the consumers’ interest. Ricardo itself is anxious to prevent any commu-
nication between auction participants, as the participants may collude and arrange price
agreements in order to avoid auction fees.
Shill bidders who attempt to raise the sales price, but also wish to avoid ending up as
the highest bidder, typically have to make decisions under uncertainty about the maximum
bid that another (proxy) bidder has entered. However, the AJAX standard request for
the bidding history of (currently running) auctions on ricardo returned the value of the
entered maximum bid along with the bidding history. Therefore, the combination of
ricardo’s proxy bidding system and its information leakage which submits the highest
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bidder’s maximum bid is virtually an invitation to shill.
On April 22, 2014, ricardo.ch blocked my IP address owing to the high traffic my
intense activity caused and, therefore, I stopped the recording. I advised ricardo.ch of
the information leakage on their platform and they closed it within a few hours. After
repeated requests, qxl.dk and qxl.no closed the leakage on their website in late July 2014.
3.2 Data Collection
The data recording occurred in the period between December 21, 2013 and April 22,
2014. At the end of an auction, its bidding history is typically available for the next two
months. This allowed me to also record auctions which had ended prior to the recording
period. With regard to the total value of sales price, this recorded dataset approximately
captures a quarter of the yearly sales on ricardo.ch.
The requests that were made to ricardo.ch’s server in order to gain the desired items of
information are described in the Appendix. Similar requests were possible for ricardo.gr,
qxl.dk and qxl.no. Only the domain and the value of the variable ‘PartnerNr’ had to be
changed according to Table 1.
Ricardo.ch does not prohibit to use computer systems for gathering information about
the activities undertaken on their platform, as long as these requests do not interfere with
its normal performance. Collecting and using these (personal) data for scientific research
conforms with the Swiss data protection law, DSG, Article 132(e).
For the analyses and figures in this paper, I disregard all recorded auctions where
either the item was sold by the buy-it-now option, multiple-items were sold in a single
auction, or an item was offered by the auction house for test purposes. In addition, I
study only manually entered (maximum) bids and disregard consecutively placed proxy
bids by the system.
3.3 Dataset Summary
Before focusing on shill bidding, I briefly discuss some key figures in the recorded dataset
shown in Table 1. These values refer to sold articles and, therefore, to auctions with
at least one bidder. The number of bids equates the number of times a bidder entered
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a new (maximum) bid. In order to compare the number of accounts across platforms,
‘active’ accounts refer to accounts which were involved in at least one recorded auction
as a bidder or seller.
Table 1: Dataset Summary
Domain ricardo.ch ricardo.gr qxl.dk qxl.no
PartnerNr 2 14 12 20
Number of auctions 1,776,459 5,302 90,383 90,389
Number of bids 7,013,419 11,209 261,584 242,575
Number of accounts 3,053,462 516,122 NA NA
Number of active1 accounts 496,083 3,854 17, 796 12, 533
Average bids per auction 3.95 2.11 2.89 2.68
Average bidders per auction 2.49 1.59 2.04 1.91
Average page views per auction 137 75 31 29
Median page views per auction 70 31 22 17
Auctions without reserve price (%) 34% 24% 13% 9%
Notes: This table summarizes the recorded dataset.
1 Active means, that the account was involved in at least one recorded auction as a bidder or as a seller.
Ricardo.ch is by far the most frequently used platform. In comparison with the other
ricardo Group platforms, over twenty times as many articles were sold via the Swiss
auction house. In addition, auctions on ricardo.ch attract on average the most bids and
the most bidders. The number of bidders and bids refers to the number of observed, not
potential, bidders and bids in an auction. Because bidders do not attend the auction
constantly throughout its duration, the order in which they arrive at the auction as well
as their strategy influences these observed values. Suppose, for example, that all bidders
bid their true valuation and all valuations differ by more than the auction-specific minimal
increment. If they arrive in ascending order of their valuations, then all bidders and their
bids are observed. If, however, the two bidders with the highest valuations arrive first,
then only their bids are observed, because the remaining bidders’ valuations are below
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the current minimum bid.
The optimal reserve price in a standard auction model exceeds the seller’s valuation
and does not depend on the number of bidders involved (e.g., Krishna, 2009). The auction
house encourages sellers to abstain from a reserve price, which is the same as the starting
price on ricardo, by giving a listing priority to auctions which give with a starting price
of CHF 1 and by charging insertion fees which typically increase with higher reservation
prices. The data show that up to one third of the sellers abstained from setting a reserve
price. These sellers either attach nearly no value to their item and, therefore, the provided
benefits of no-reserve price exceed the sellers’ valuation, or they did not set an optimal
reserve price.
The final value fee on ricardo.ch was not observable and has to be calculated. During
the observation period this fee had a staggered structure. For the first CHF 200 of the sales
price, the final value fee was 6.5%; for the next CHF 800, the final value fee was 4.5%, and
amounts beyond CHF 1,000 were charged for 2.5%. If, for example, an item has been sold
for CHF 1,400, then the final value fee was CHF 59 (200×0.065+800×0.045+400×0.025).
The final value fee differs for items listed in the category ‘motors’, including ‘parts and
accessories’. The final value fee for these items amounted CHF 29, CHF 39, CHF 49 or
CHF 59, depending whether the sales price was in the range CHF 0–1,000, CHF 1,000.01–
3,000, CHF 3,000.01–5,000 or above CHF 5,000.01.
4 Shill Bidding on ricardo
Owning multiple accounts is not prohibited in the terms and conditions of ricardo. How-
ever, ricardo explicitly prohibits shill bids placed either: (1) by the seller; (2) by a person
living in the seller’s household; or, (3) by any person acting on behalf of the seller. Breach
of this paragraph is sanctioned by issuing a caution or suspension.
4.1 Identifying Obvious Shill Bidders on the Basis of Personal
Data
The accounts’ personal details enable me to identify obvious shill bidders. Accounts which
are registered with identical full name, address, postal code and zip are assigned to a single
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person (fullAddress). Identical mobile phone numbers also indicate the same person and
the identical landline phone numbers indicate that the persons live in the same household
(phoneNumber). In addition, I treat accounts with identical last names, addresses, postal
codes and zip codes as individuals inhabiting the same household (shortAddress), being
aware of the fact that this criterion might contain incorrect relationships.
Table 2 shows that on ricardo.ch more than half of all the accounts belong to individ-
uals who own one single account. Most individuals with multiple accounts are identified
through their phone number, whereas half of all users specified their mobile phone number.
Table 2: Identification of Multiple Accounts
ricardo.ch ricardo.gr
Accounts Individuals Accounts Individuals
phoneNumber 813,720 348,296 299,885 134,635
fullAddress 378,506 171,102 33,666 15,507
shortAddress 726,383 305,270 42,202 19,161
potentialShillBidAccounts 1,413,590 487,970 329,891 140,252
Notes: This table shows: (1) the number of individuals who own multiple accounts; (2) the number of accounts these
individuals own; and, (3) through which personal details variable the assignment occurs. As some accounts might be
identified through more than one of these criteria, potentialShillBidAccounts reports the number of accounts that fulfill at
least one criterion.
This approach does not have the capacity to identify relationships between individuals
who have different last names or who do not live at the same address. In particular, I
cannot assign two accounts to one specific individual if the person moved and opened up
a new account afterwards.
A shill bidder cannot be identified simply by the number of accounts an individual
owns, but instead by whether or not he uses more than one account in a specific auction.
Table 3 shows the number of identified shill bid accounts as well as the number of indi-
viduals owning them. Of the half a million potential shill bidding individuals, only two
thousand are accurately identified to be shill bidders.
On ricardo.gr, the share of auctions in which a shill bid occurred is 0.15% of the
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Table 3: Identified Shill Bid Accounts
ricardo.ch ricardo.gr
Accounts Individuals Accounts Individuals
identicalUser none none
phoneNumber 2,518 1,214 6 3
fullAddress 284 142 none
shortAddress 1,950 967 2 1
shillBidAccounts 3,902 1,895 8 4
Notes: This table shows: (1) the number of individuals who are accurately identified shill bidders; (2) the number of
accounts these individuals used for their shills (seller and buyer accounts); and, (3) through which criterion the they are
identified. As some accounts might be identified through more than one of these criteria, shillBidAccounts reports the
number of accounts that fulfill at least one criterion.
total. However, this share results from only eight influenced auctions. For this reason,
the following shill bid analysis addresses solely the shill bidding behavior on ricardo.ch.
The 3,902 shillBidAccounts on ricardo.ch placed shill bids in 6,183 auctions (0.35% of
the total). If only auctions with more than one bidder are considered, then the share of
influenced auctions almost doubles to 0.66%. These values are lower than previous findings
in the literature. However, they solely represent a lower bound on shill bidding because
shill bidders who use, for example, third-party accounts are not identified. Auctions with
the minimum starting price of CHF 1 were affected more than three times as much from
shill bids than auctions with a reserve price.
Regarding product categories, auctions listed in the category ‘motors’ were influenced
most often, with 1.8%. The correlation between a category’s mean selling price and the
share of influenced auctions is 0.80. Shill bidders tend to bid in categories where high-
valued items are sold and where, therefore, a percentage increase in the final sales price
results in correspondingly high profits.
The data show that the correlation between the mean number of honest bidders and
the share of influenced auctions in a category is 0.89. Auctions on motors, for example,
attract on average 6.3 honest bidders, which is more than twice as many as found for the
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other categories. Moreover, auctions which were influenced by shill bids show on average
a higher participation rate of honest bidders in all categories. This result is contrary to
my expectation; especially, for auctions with a low number of bidders or weak competition
I would have expected to observe relatively more price-driving shill bids.
4.2 Profiteers and Victims of Shill Bids
Since the final value fee rises with the sales price, the auctioneer gains from shill bids.
This positive relationship is often used to explain for the lack of incentive that auctioneers
have in countering shill bidding. In this subsection, I determine the auctioneer’s additional
profit which arises from shill bids in order to gain fresh insight on the strength of this
argument. I further evaluate the seller’s fraudulently gained surplus, as well as the honest
bidders’ losses.
I calculate these values by eliminating shill bids from auction histories, while holding
all other bidding decisions constant. This approach ignores the fact that (non-observed)
bidders would probably have placed further bids as a result of a lower standing bid, because
including such effects is not possible without major assumptions. For the same reason, I
further abstain from including strategic interaction (e.g., Chakraborty and Kosmopoulou,
2004) or optimal decisions such as the choice of the starting price.
The redistribution effects depend on whether the shill bidder won the auction or was
the second highest bidder.
• In 1,944 auctions, neither of the above was the case and, therefore, the final sales
price has not been influenced by shill bids.
• 1,677 auctions ended with the shill bid as the second highest bid. These shill bids
increased the total sales price by approximately CHF 67,000 and increased the auctioneer’s
revenue from final value fees by CHF 2,000 (2.8% of the redistributed buyer rents). On
average, these bidders bought the items at a price that was CHF 40, or 25%, higher than
it would have been without shill bids.
• Shill bidders won 2,562 auctions with a total value of CHF 600,000. For these
auctions, the auction house charged them final value fees of over CHF 21,000.
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The large share of unsuccessful shill bids might indicate that not all of them had the
intention of actually selling the item. Even though I can only speculate about their inten-
tions, incentives to win their own auction might arise, for example, from: (1) increasing
the accounts reputation through the rating system; (2) learning about the item’s market
value for a later sale; (3) avoiding an obligation to sell the item at a low price as a result
of weak competition and a suboptimal reserve price; or, (4) direct benefits from such
fictional sales.
In summary, honest bidders were cheated for the amount of CHF 67,000, which corre-
sponds to 0.05% of the total sales value. This fraudulently gained amount is accompanied
by final value fees of successful and unsuccessful shills amounting to CHF 23,000. These
payments to the auctioneer account for 0.27% of all the observed auctions’ final value
fees.
4.3 Ricardo’s Success in Prohibiting Obvious Shill Bidding
Identifying shill bids through personal details is the easiest way of detecting the obvious
case of shill bidding. Such behavior could be automatically detected in real-time, without
requiring much effort from the auction house. I do not claim to judge ricardo’s attempt to
fight other more sophisticated and, potentially, more important shill bidding strategies.
Moreover, I do not have any data on the resources spent on preventing fraud in general.
However, the presence in the auction of bidders who can repeatedly place shill bids is not
in line with a successful enforcement of ricardo’s terms and conditions.
Table 4 displays such repeated shill bidding activities. During my observation period,
shill bids were placed by 1,895 different individuals. In total, 54% of them shilled in one
single auction. Either these individuals were cautioned and abstained from further shill
bids, or the observation period did not capture further shills. However, more important
than this percentage, are the remaining 46%.
According to ricardo’s terms and conditions, individuals who place bids for reasons
other than winning the auction get cautioned for their first offense. For a second offense,
they are barred from the platform. Therefore, all individuals who influenced at least two
auctions through shill bidding should have been barred from further auction participation,
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Table 4: Influence of Single Shill Bidders
number of involved blocked suspended
influenced auctions individuals accounts accounts accounts
1 1,016 2,032 67 47
2 335 694 28 11
3-20 507 1,084 60 18
21-40 25 63 5 0
41-60 5 14 1 1
61-80 3 6 0 0
over 80 4 9 2 0
Total 1,895 3,902 163 77
Notes: This table shows how many auctions a single bidder has influenced through a shill bid account. The number of
blocked or suspended accounts refer to the accounts’ status on April 22, 2014.
and their accounts should have been closed. But only 7% of the accounts involved in shill
bidding activities were either suspended or closed on April 22, 2014. The analyses in this
section show that shill bidding with a second user account, containing identifying personal
details, was not consequentially and efficiently sanctioned by ricardo.ch.
The fact that the two blocked accounts that are responsible for manipulating over 80
auctions do not belong to the same individual implies that these accounts must have been
blocked due to other offenses. If these accounts would have been blocked due to their shill
bidding activities, then the second account of these individuals would have been blocked
as well.
4.4 Categorizing Identified Shill Bids
The literature generally describes four different types of shill bidding, namely: Reserve-
Price Shilling; Competitive Shilling; Buy-Back Shilling; and Discover-and-Stop Shilling.
The aim of this subsection is to determine which shilling strategy most commonly occurs
on ricardo.ch. Shill bids are, as in the previous subsections, identified either through
the phoneNumber, the fullAddress, or the shortAddress. Rather than categorizing the
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account, I regard and categorize each shill bid or each shill bid sequence, respectively.
This approach takes into account that the majority of the individuals use different shill
bidding strategies.
The Discover-and-Stop strategy is not applicable on ricardo. If bH ≥ bA, then ricardo’s
proxy bidding system places a bet at bA for H. H remains the highest bidder, because
earlier bids are given priority. However, I assign bids as if this strategy would be possible
on ricardo in order to examine whether the behavior of some shill bidders nonetheless
meets the Discover-and-Stop Shilling criteria.
The Competitive Shilling strategy as well as the Discover-and-Stop Shilling strategy
typically need more than one bid. I name these bids ‘Auxiliary Shill Bids’. As entered
maximum bids can be publicly observed on ricardo, a shill bidder can simply bid the
same maximum price in order to raise the current sales price. I call this strategy ‘Insider
Shilling’.
In order to increase the number of bids that can be assigned to a specific bid type, I
define two additional types which allow for a more tolerant interpretation of the Discover-
and-Stop and Competitive Shilling strategy. The Conservative-Discover-and-Stop Shilling
strategy allows the bidder to underbid the maximum bid by up to 10 increments and
considers that the expected profit loss from overbidding the highest bidder increases along
with higher prices. This risk causes the shill bidder to stop discovering the highest price,
even though the hidden maximum price is still more than one increment over the current
highest bid. Another interpretation would be, that the shill bidder simply tries to raise
the price, while trying to avoid becoming the highest bidder. The Aggressive-Competitive
Shilling strategy allows a shill bidder to overbid the current maximum bid by up to 10
increments. This strategy reduces the shill bidder’s number of bids that he has to submit
for a specific article. The time that is thereby saved might offset the higher risk of buying
the article in the end, especially if the competing bidder does not use the proxy bidding
system. If a shill bid does not satisfy the criteria of any of these eight types, then this
bid is assigned to the type ‘Others’.
Figure 1 shows the criteria according to which I categorize identified shill bids into
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Figure 1: Categorizing Identified Shill Bids
Identified
Shill Bids
is an Auxiliary
Shill Bid
Auxiliary
Shill Bids
follows an
Auxiliary
Shill Bid
is auction’s
first bid
relative
bid time
Reserve-Price
is winning bid
inc min ≥ 1
and winning
inc max = 0
Buy-Back
inc max
Insider
Conservative Discover-and-Stop
Discover-and-Stop
Competitive
Aggressive Competitive
Others
12,569
yes
324
no 12,245
no
12,020
yes
225
yes
551
no 11,469
>0.7 122
<0.7 429
yes
86
no
36
no
10,618
yes 851
no
10,618
yes 0
[-10,-1)
2,772
[-1,0]
1,421
(0,1]
1,703
(1,10]
1,050
else
3,897
Notes: This figure shows how I categorize identified shill bids into different shill bidding types. The decisive criteria are:
is an Auxiliary Shill Bid: If the shill bid is followed by another shill bid within 10 minutes and one proxy bid occurred
between these two shill bids.
follows an Auxiliary Shill Bid: This shill follows — but is not itself — an Auxiliary Shill Bid.
is auction’s first bid: If this bid is the first bid of the auction.
relative bid time: Bid time relative to the auction’s duration.
is winning bid: If this bid is the winning bid of the auction.
inc min: The bid’s increment compared to the minimal bid required.
inc max: The bid’s increment compared to the current maxBid.
The italic numbers express how many bids feature a specific characteristic.
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different shill bidding types as well as how many bids feature a specific characteristic.
Around one fifth (22%) of the 12,569 shill bids are identified as (Aggressive) Compet-
itive Shill bids, and about one third (33%) of the shill bids follow the (Conservative)
Discover-and-Stop Shilling strategy. Insider Shilling was never observed. This shows that
the information leakage about the current maximum bid remained unexploited by the
identified shill bidders.
This section’s findings imply that the reliable identification of shill bidders based on
publicly observable behavior is a difficult task. Around one third (31%) of the identified
shill bids do not match any of the labled strategy’s criterion and are categorized as ‘Others’.
Moreover, shilling individuals were identified as having pursued multiple shilling strategies
during the observed period.
5 Shill Bidder Identification Algorithms
In this subsection, I adopt two algorithms, one suggested by Trevathan and Read [2005]
and the other by Engelberg and Williams [2009], and I check whether their suggested
methods can reliably identify the proven shill bidder accounts in my dataset.
5.1 Algorithm Suggested by Trevathan and Read [2005]
Trevathan and Read [2005] identify shill bidders based on the weighted average of six
shilling variables, namely:
α: The participation rate of the bidder in auctions provided by a particular seller.
β: The bidder’s average percentage of bids submitted throughout all the auctions he
participated in.
γ: The share of auctions the bidder won (normalized value).
δ: The bidder’s average inter-bid time (normalized value).
: The bidder’s average inter-bid increment (normalized value).
ζ: The average time of the bidder’s first submitted bid (normalized value).
The bidders’ behavior is summarized in a shill score: SS = w1α+w2β+w3γ+w4δ+w5+w6ζ
w1+w2+w3+w4+w5+w6 ×10.
All of the shilling variables’ values range between 0 and 1. A higher value implies a higher
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probability that this bidder is shilling. Decisive for the calculation of β, δ and  are the
entered maximum bids and not the bids placed by the proxy bidding system. If a bidder
won the auction, his α, β, δ,  and ζ values for this auction are set to zero. Further details
on the shilling values’ calculation and their associated weights are provided in Trevathan
and Read [2005].
I check their method on a subset for which the algorithm should perform best. This
subset consists auctions offered by accurately identified shilling individuals. I further
exclude 33 sellers who used more than one shill bidder account in a specific auction and
another 79 sellers who used more than one shill bidder over all auctions. Therefore, if
an individual is not marked as a shill bidder, then this individual is almost certainly an
honest, non-shilling bidder. Finally, the analyzed subset contains 1,913 sellers who sold
49,650 articles. In this analysis, 81,921 pairs of sellers and bidders are rated.
For each pair of sellers and bidders, I calculate: the shill score as well as the shill
score ranking of a bidder compared to the other bidders who bid on articles offered by
this seller. Figure 2 shows, on the left-hand side, the score’s or ranking’s distribution for
shill bidders as well as honest bidders. The Student’s t-test as well as the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov-test are significant to the 1 percent level and therefore imply that the types’ score
distributions differ. The right-hand side of Figure 2 shows the algorithm’s false-positive
rate and false-negative rate for different threshold values.
Even though the shill score and the ranking provide an indication of whether the
bidder’s behavior is suspicious, the type II error prevents a reliable identification of the
proven shill bidders in this subset. For example: If bidders whose shill score ranking
equals 1 are incriminated as shill bidders, then 223 (11.6%) of the actual shill bidders
will be correctly incriminated, while 1,851 (2.3%) of the honest bidders will be falsely
incriminated.
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Figure 2: Performance of the Trevathan and Read [2005] Identification Algorithm
(a) Shill Score: Distribution (b) Shill Score: Identification Errors
(c) Shill Ranking: Distribution (d) Shill Ranking: Identification Errors
Notes: The histograms on the left-hand side show the score’s or, respectively, the ranking’s distribution for shill bidders
and honest bidders. The figures on the right-hand side show the type I and type II error of the bidder’s identification for
different threshold values.
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5.2 Algorithm Suggested by Engelberg and Williams [2009]
Engelberg and Williams [2009] identify shill bidders by using their newly identified Discover-
and-Stop strategy as a proxy for shill bidding. They estimate a probit regression model
that is based on six publicly observable variables in order to identify bidders who follow
the Discover-and-Stop strategy. These shilling variables are:
BidderCount: The number of bidders in an auction.
ClosingPrice: The sales price at which the auction ended.
BRating: The user rating as a proxy for experience.
NumAuctions: The number of auctions provided by a particular seller in which the bidder
participated.
FracBid: The participation rate of the bidder in auctions provided by a particular
seller.
FracLose: The share of auctions the bidder lost.
In order to separate the calculation of NumAuctions, FracBid and FracLose from the
Discover-and-Stop identification, Engelberg and Williams [2009] split their sample into
two distinct time periods. Engelberg and Williams [2009] considered only Event Ticket
auctions, because they expected heterogeneous private values and considerable bid amount
dispersion in this category.
I am able to use my whole observation period to calculate the variable values, because
shill bidders are identified according to their personal details and not according to their
behavior. Table 5 shows the probit regressions’ output based on several subsets of my
ricardo.ch dataset.
The subsets used for the regression results in Column (1) and Column (2) contain
auctions from all categories. In contrast to Column (1), Column (2) is based on auctions
which were solely offered by shilling sellers. The coefficient values in Column (3) refer to
a subset which includes only Event Ticket auctions.
Column (4) compares most closely to the subsets used by Engelberg and Williams
[2009] which are shown in Column (5) and Column (6). The coefficients of the regression
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output differ with regard to their value and significance. Compared to Column (5) and
Column (6), the coefficient values for BRating and FracBid are not significant for the
ricardo sample, FracLose is significant and BidderCount shows a negative coefficient value.
For this subset, the algorithm is able to reliably identify shill bidders; i.e., reliable in terms
of correctly incriminating 73% of actual shill bidders, while only falsely incriminating 44
(0.1%) of the honest bidders. However, my subsample includes only 15 shill bidders who
used a strategy that looks like Discover-and-Stop shilling.
The positive coefficient for FracLose is in line with the argument that shill bidders do
not usually intend to win the auction. The reverse but still significant value for Bidder-
Count can be explained by the fact that a higher number of bidders increase competition
and lead to a more aggressive bidding behavior. In such an environment, shill bids are
not as profitable as they are in auctions with only a few bidders.
The regressions’ coefficient values differ with regard to their significance as well as
whether they increase or decrease the bidder’s probability of being a shill bidder. The
differences in these regression outputs might be explained by the fact that the Discover-
and-Stop Shilling strategy cannot be used on ricardo and, therefore, these shill bidders’
behavior just looks like Discover-and-Stop Shilling.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of the estimated probability that a bidder shills as
well as the type I and type II error of the bidder’s identification. The distribution of
the estimated probability might indicate that the algorithm suggested by Engelberg and
Williams [2009] can reliably identify shill bidders in other subsets than the one used
for Column (4). However, the axis scaling absorbs the large imbalance between honest
and shill bidders. The type II error reveals that achieving a low type I error without
incriminating too many honest bidders of shilling is not possible.
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Figure 3: Performance of the Engelberg and Williams [2009] Identification Algorithm
(a) Distribution: Table 5, Column (2) (b) Identification Errors: Table 5, Column (2)
(c) Distribution: Table 5, Column (3) (d) Identification Errors: Table 5, Column (3)
(e) Distribution: Table 5, Column (4) (f) Identification Errors: Table 5, Column (4)
Notes: The histograms on the left-hand side show the distribution of the estimated probability that a bidder shills, for
both; shill bidders and honest bidders. The figures on the right-hand side show the type I and type II error of the bidder’s
identification for different threshold values.
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6 Analyzing Bidders’ Behavior
This section compares selected characteristics of the bidders’ behavior across eBay and
the four platforms provided by the ricardo Group. The comparative figures for 11,495 U.S.
based auctions on eBay originate from Hayne et al. [2003]. The transnational comparison
in Table 6 aims to assess whether or not the previous results on ricardo.ch can be applied
to other platforms. In this section, I use only data from auctions with at least two bidders.
On the one hand, these auctions are more interesting, as they allow observations, such
as multiple bids per bidder in an auction. On the other hand, since Hayne et al. [2003]
calculated his values for auctions with more than one bidder, I adopt this restriction.
The term ‘unique bidders’ refers to the number of different, active accounts in the
dataset. In contrast, the total number of bidders sums up the number of unique bidders
per auction over all auctions. Only one tenth of all auctions on ricardo.gr received bids
from more than one bidder. In contrast to this, on ricardo.ch, qxl.dk, and qxl.no one half
of all auctions had more than one bidder. Table 6 shows that each individual (unique
bidder) recorded in ricardo’s data placed around 10 bids on average, whereas only a few
individuals in the data provided by Hayne et al. [2003] placed more than one bid. The
average experience of the active bidders is very different across the platforms. On the
one hand, the average bidders’ experience for ricardo.gr is much lower compared to the
other platforms, which is not surprising considering the number of articles sold. On the
other hand, qxl.dk and qxl.no have a five-times higher average bidders’ experience than
ricardo.ch and eBay. However, these averages are driven by outliers.
The mean number of bids and of unique bidders is similar across all platforms. My
dataset contains the information about the winning bidder’s maximum bid that he entered
in the proxy bidding system. Therefore, all bids, or respectively bidders, can be classified
for ricardo. In addition, Table 6 shows that on average the winner’s entered proxy bid is
between 20% and 50% higher than the mean sales price. The values of the articles sold on
the Norwegian platform are on average substantially higher than for those sold on other
platforms.
Table 6 shows that the five platforms are similar regarding the bids’ and the bidders’
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Table 6: Transnational Comparison of Bidders’ Behavior in Auctions
ricardo.ch ricardo.gr qxl.dk qxl.no eBay1
Data Summary
number of auctions, 906,336 1,143 38,716 37,778 11,495
total number of bids 9,325,449 9,578 265,663 243,647 77,926
total number of unique bidders 386,834 1,744 11,824 10,062 40,754
total number of bidders 3,595,801 4,437 132,563 119,776 45,797
accounts’ average experience rating 127 29 830 694 112
mean number of bids 10.3 8.4 6.9 6.5 6.8
mean number of (unique) bidders 4.0 3.9 3.4 3.2 4.0
mean starting price 42.4 28.8 40.9 96.1 19.4
mean winning bid amount 110.5 53.4 123.7 251.6 63.1
winner’s mean entered proxy bid 166.2 56.3 150.9 322.60 NA
Bids Classified by Frequency
single bid (%) 22.5 28.6 31.0 30.0 38.6
multi-bid (%) 77.5 71.4 69.0 70.0 61.4
Auction Success of Bidders Classified by Frequency
single bid bidders (%) 58.3 61.7 62.2 61.1 65.7
auctions won (%) 50.6 55.5 53.8 55.0 57.9
success rate (%) 55.1 60.4 58.8 60.7 NA
average experience rating 990 100 2,819 3,142 155
multi-bid bidders (%) 41.7 38.3 37.8 38.9 34.3
auctions won (%) 49.4 44.5 46.2 45.0 42.1
success rate (%) 67.8 68.0 67.6 64.7 NA
average experience rating 547 82 2,664 2,352 100
Bids Classified by Bid Strategy
proxy bids (%) 37.3 20.8 49.4 51.8 75.0
incremental bids (%) 62.7 79.2 50.6 48.2 20.1
unclassifiable bids (%) 0 0 0 0 4.9
Auction Success of Bidders Classified by Bid Strategy
only proxy bidders (%) 19.7 11.2 20.6 22.9 73.1
auctions won (%) 46.6 27.6 47.9 53.8 72.1
success rate (%) 62.0 50.8 69.3 72.3 81.2
average experience rating 829 232 2,160 2,515 145
only incremental bidders (%) 33.0 57.6 24.9 21.8 13.6
auctions won (%) 26.3 55.7 19.3 14.7 5.6
success rate (%) 32.8 58.8 24.6 20.9 12.6
average experience rating 698 58 3,259 3,483 133
proxy and incremental bidders (%) 47.4 31.2 54.5 55.3 10.1
auctions won (%) 27.1 16.6 32.8 31.5 9.5
success rate (%) 52.6 50.8 56.8 54.2 29.4
average experience rating 534 90 2,669 2,353 78
unclassifiable bidders (%) 0 0 0 0 3.2
Notes: This table shows a transnational comparison of bidder’s behavior in auctions with more than one bidder.
1 The comparative figures for 11,495 U.S. based auctions on eBay originate from Hayne et al. [2003].
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frequency classification. In contrast, the four platforms of the ricardo Group differ from
eBay with regard to the use of the proxy bidding system. Ricardo as well as eBay recom-
mend proxy bidding to the bidders (entering their article’s valuation), as this behavior is
the weakly dominant strategy in a second-price sealed bid auction. One reason for the
observation of a higher share of incremental bidders who place multiple bids per auction
might be the different methods for identifying proxy bids. My dataset includes a variable
which indicates proxy bids. In contrast, an identification based on the bidding time falsely
identifies a fast series of incremental bids as proxy bids.
Incremental bidding is often (e.g., Ockenfels and Roth [2006]) associated with inexpe-
rienced bidders who behave as if the articles are auctioned in a first-price auction without
proxy bidding. However, my dataset does not support the supposition. Incremental bid-
ders are usually just as experienced as proxy bidders and bidders who place both, proxy
and incremental bids.
Ockenfels and Roth [2006] analyze how different ending rules influence bidder’s behav-
ior and might explain the observed behavioral differences. Ricardo uses a ‘soft close’ end-
ing rule with an automatic run-time expansion of three minutes, whereas the run-time
on eBay does not depend on the bids’ timing (‘hard close’). If bidders place proxy bids
which are lower than their valuation (or if they adjust their valuation over time), then the
time expansion rule on ricardo might tempt bidders to react to other bidders’ late bids.
In contrast to this, eBay’s hard close ending rule favors sniping, which does not allow for
further (incremental) bids and results in the higher success rate of proxy bids on eBay.
Even though Table 6 reveals some differences between the platforms, on the whole the
five platforms show quite similar values regarding the bidders’ behavior.
7 Conclusion
Confidential information such as an individual’s personal details and the maximum bid
entered into the proxy bidding system is not publicly available and is generally subject to
data protection. By exploiting an information leakage, I was able to record this informa-
tion along with the bidding histories of almost two million auctions which took place on
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ricardo.ch.
By using the accounts’ personal details, this is the first study that does not need to
infer shill bidders from a specific kind of behavior. In contrast to the existing litera-
ture, these auction data provide a unique opportunity to accurately identify obvious shill
bidders. Moreover, I am able to calculate the redistribution effects of shilling, to assess
ricardo’s success in preventing obvious shill bidding, and to test shill-bidder identification
algorithms.
I provide evidence that at least 0.35% of all auctions on ricardo.ch were influenced
by obvious shill bids. This value is a lower bound on actual shill bidding, because more
cautious shill bidders, who, for example, use third-party accounts to place bids remain
unidentified.
Approximately two thousand individuals placed obvious shill bids in 6,183 auctions. In
1,677 of these auctions, the auction ended with the shill bid being the second highest bid.
These shill bids increased the final sales price on average by CHF 40, or 25% respectively.
Repeated obvious shill bidding was not consequentially and efficiently sanctioned on
ricardo.ch. However, the additional final value fees from shill bids compared to the total
final value fees earned (0.27%) is very low. This finding invites an analytical reappraisal of
the auctioneer’s incentive to overlook shill bids. I doubt that the auctioneer intentionally
allows shills in order to slightly increase his profit. To me it seems more likely, that
either this fraudulent behavior was treated as a bearable loss or the possibility to identify
obvious shill bids through personal details has not yet been recognized and implemented.
According to shill-bidding types which have been characterized in previous studies,
Competitive Shilling, where the seller continuously outbids the highest bidder up to a
certain amount, occurred most often. However, around one quarter of the identified shill
bids did not match any type’s criterion and this share would have been considerably higher
without the newly introduced strategies ‘Conservative-Discover-and-Stop Shilling’ and
‘Aggressive-Competitive Shilling’.
I adopt two methods which aim to identify shill bidders based on public information
in order to check whether the proven shill bidders can be reliably identified according to
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the suggested algorithms. Both algorithms, one suggested by Trevathan and Read [2005]
and the other by Engelberg and Williams [2009], assign on average a higher probability
of being a shill bidder to actual shill bidders. Using a subsample from my data that cor-
responds to the criteria of the dataset used by Engelberg and Williams [2009], I am able
to show that their algorithm reliably identifies shill bidders based on public information.
Notwithstanding this case, both algorithms incriminate a greater number of truthful bid-
ders than actual shill bidders who are identified. Although these approaches may indicate
suspicious accounts, their type II errors are too high for a reliably identification.
The auction house is in an optimal position to prohibit (obvious) shill bids, and,
thereby, customers should expect the auction house to invest substantial effort in enforcing
its terms and conditions. Even though several honest customers were cheated by obvious
shill bidders, this paper shows that this is a rather rare event and that the auctioneer’s
monetary incentive to overlook shill bids is relatively low. The strategies of these shill
bidders are diverse and often do not even match any type characterized in the literature.
With this finding in mind, the limited success of identifying shill bidders based on bidders’
publicly observable behavior is not surprising. The transnational comparison of bidder’s
behavior shows that bidding behavior is almost the same over all platforms provided
by the ricardo Group and eBay (USA). Therefore, the results of this paper should be
generally applicable to other auction platforms.
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8 Appendix
Structure of the the requests to ricardo.ch’s server in order to gain the desired information.
User Details Ricardo assigns a unique user number userNr to each user account. This
identification number remains the same, irrespective of whether the personal details
or the nickName change.
The requests took the following structure:
http://www.ricardo.ch/DataService/Proxy.aspx?DataService.svc/json/
GetAuctionSellerInfos?UserNr=userNr&PartnerNr=2&IsHttps=false
The server’s response to the request on my account contained, amongst other things,
the following excerpt:
[...] ‘PhoneNumber’:‘0041615546909’ [...] ‘City’:‘Basel’ [...] ‘Street’:‘Winkel-
riedplatz’,‘StreetNr’:‘9’,‘ZipCode’:‘4053’ [...] ‘UserFirstName’:‘Dominic’,
‘UserLastName’:‘Herzog’ [...]
Table 7 lists the variables which were recorded for each account and indicates for
which platform the corresponding value was submitted. On ricardo.ch and ri-
cardo.gr, the algorithm requested and recorded the personal details of all the re-
spective 3,054,104 and 516,206 currently available user accounts.
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Table 7: Submitted Variables Upon a Server Request on User Details
ricardo. qxl.
Variable Name Description ch gr dk no
userNr unique user ID x x x x
nickName user nickname x x x x
* firstName user first name x x
* lastName user last name x x
* street user address: street x x
* streetNr user address: street number x x
* compStreet user address: street complementary x x
* zip user address: ZIP code x x
* city user address: city x x
* country user address: country x x
* phoneNr user (mobile) phone number x x
* company company’s name x x
memberSince registration date x x x x
rating positive ratings minus negative ratings received x x x x
sharePosRating share of positive ratings received x x x x
boughtItems total number of items bought x x x x
soldItems total number of items sold x x x x
pos 2 positive ratings received during the last 2 months x x x x
pos 6 positive ratings received during the last 6 months x x x x
pos 12 positive ratings received during the last 12 months x x x x
pos all overall positive ratings received x x x x
pos diffUser pos all received from heterogeneous users x x x x
neu 2 neutral ratings received during the last 2 months x x x x
neu 6 neutral ratings received during the last 6 months x x x x
neu 12 neutral ratings received during the last 12 months x x x x
neu all overall neutral ratings received x x x x
neu diffUser neu all received from heterogeneous users x x x x
neg 2 negative ratings received during the last 2 months x x x x
neg 6 negative ratings received during the last 6 months x x x x
neg 12 negative ratings received during the last 12 months x x x x
neg all overall negative ratings received x x x x
neg diffUser neg all received from heterogeneous users x x x x
* buyerStatus values: 0-4 (interpretation unknown) x x x x
* hasGlasses values: TRUE and FALSE (interpretation unknown) x x x x
* isCertified values: TRUE and FALSE (interpretation unknown) x x x x
* memberClass values: 0-4 (interpretation unknown) x x x x
* sellerStatus values: 0-4 (interpretation unknown) x x x x
* sellerType values: 0-4 (interpretation unknown) x x x x
* stats values: 0-640 (interpretation unknown) x x x x
* userRating rating the user gave x x x x
suspended account has been blocked or suspended x x
suspendedDate date when the account has been blocked or suspended x x
Notes: This table lists and describes the variables which were recorded for each account. Unfortunately, the interpretation
of seven variables could not be accurately revealed. The variables’ values were submitted and recorded for the platforms
marked with an ‘x’.
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Auction Details and Their Bidding Histories Ricardo assigns a unique articleID to
each auction. This number remains the same even if an article has not been sold
and the item is re-auctioned. The algorithm stored articleIDs from current auctions
and requested the auction’s information once the auction was closed. The requests
took the following structure:
http://auto.ricardo.ch/DataService/Proxy.aspx?DataService.svc/json/
GetBidsHistory?AuctionNr=articleID&PartnerNr=2&NbBidsToShow=20000
&IsArchived=false&IsHttps=false
The auction’s details and the bidding history were recorded for each of the two
million auctions. Table 8 and Table 9 list the recorded variables.
Table 8: Submitted Variables Upon a Server Request on Auction Details
Variable Name Description
articleID referred article ID
requestDate request date
startPrice auction’s starting price
fixPrice auction’s fixed-price
sellPrice final sales price
* maxBidPrice the winner’s maximum bid entered
bidIncrement minimal bid increment
it highestBidder winner’s nickname
highest bidder id winner’s user ID
endDateLong auction’s end date
* startDateLong auction’s start date
timeLeftLong time left until the auction ends
seller id seller’s user ID
it sellerNick seller’s nickname
it condition article’s condition
it availability number of items available
it pageViews number of page requests
it delivery link delivery expenses
it ArticleDescription article’s description
Notes: This table lists and describes the variables which were recorded for each auction. All variables’ values were submitted
and recorded for ricardo.ch, ricardo.gr, qxl.dk and qxl.no.
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Table 9: Submitted Variables Upon a Server Request on the Auction History
Variable Name Description
articleID referred article ID
userNr unique user ID
nickName user nickname
BidPrice bid
* MaxBidPrice maximum bid
BidDate bid’s date
BidStatus values: 0, 1, 4, 8
BiddedQuantity number of items desired
Notes: This table lists and describes the variables which were recorded for each auction. The userNr has not been recorded
for qxl.dk and qxl.no. All other variables’ values were submitted and recorded for ricardo.ch, ricardo.gr, qxl.dk and qxl.no.
The values for the variable BidStatus mean: (0) this bidder placed a higher bid later on; (1) winning bid; (4) retrieved bid;
and, (8) this bidder’s highest bid.
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